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CRIMINAL LAW—MIRRORING THE TRIAL: MAKING 
SENSE OF THE LAW OF CLOSING ARGUMENT IN CRIMINAL 
CASES 
Alex J. Grant* 
The law of closing arguments in criminal cases has proven to be a 
minefield for prosecutors and judges.  Whereas criminal convictions 
can be overturned because of improper argument by the government, 
acquittals obtained through improper argument by defense counsel 
cannot be reviewed because of the Double Jeopardy clause.  Two 
rules, the prohibition against vouching and the proscription against 
the expression of personal opinions, have proven to be very difficult 
to apply in a coherent manner, to the point that argument about the 
credibility of witnesses has been prohibited in some jurisdictions.  
Jury nullification arguments by the defense tend to creep into a 
criminal trial during summation, and they present a difficult dilemma 
for the ethical prosecutor.  Sometimes error in closing argument 
occurs when the prosecutor attempts to respond to appeals for jury 
nullification, that is, for a verdict outside the law and the evidence 
presented in the courtroom.  An effective means of policing closing 
arguments and of preventing jury nullification would be a rule that 
requires closing arguments to mirror the trial.  This “mirroring” 
principle means that the scope of closing argument should be the same 
as the scope of the facts and law presented during the trial.  This 
principle would set out logical boundaries of proper and improper 
argument, and it would help trial judges identify and thwart pleas for 
jury nullification. 
 
* Assistant United States Attorney, District of Massachusetts; Senior Adjunct Professor 
of Law, Western New England University School of Law.  The views expressed in this Article 
are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Attorney’s 
Office or the United States Department of Justice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The law of closing arguments in criminal trials is, in many respects, 
a series of hazy lines,1 which courts have labored to apply in a consistent 
or coherent fashion.  For the practitioner, that is to say, the prosecutor,2 it 
represents a minefield of maxims, or as the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit has said, “fundamental verities.”3  In the most famous 
formulation, a prosecutor may strike “hard blows” but not “foul ones.”4  
The prosecutor may be a vigorous advocate, “so long as he does not stray 
into forbidden terrain.”5  Verbal formulations such as these have not done 
much, and reported decisions have done precious little, to stake out the 
boundaries of this “forbidden terrain.”  As a result, the federal and state 
case reports in every jurisdiction continue to collect criminal cases in 
which convictions are overturned, or nearly overturned, by what is said 
during closing argument.6 
This Article is directed toward a couple of species of improper 
argument, the prohibitions against vouching, and the expressions of 
personal opinion.  Left to the side are more obvious sins, such as 
commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify during a trial,7 referencing 
the defendant’s post-arrest silence,8 or injecting racial or similar prejudice 
 
1. See United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 483 (1st Cir. 1993) (“The line between 
the legitimate argument that a witness’s testimony is credible and improper ‘vouching’ is often 
a hazy one . . . .”). 
2. This law is directed at prosecutors because improper argument by defense counsel 
which results in an acquittal can never be reviewed on appeal because the double jeopardy 
clause of the Constitution of the United States of America would bar a retrial.  United States v. 
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975). 
3. United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 976–77 (1st Cir. 1995). 
4. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
5. Taylor, 54 F.3d at 976 (quoting Palmariello v. Superintendent of M.C.I. Norfolk, 873 
F.2d 491, 494 (1st Cir. 1989)). 
6. See, e.g., United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1991) (“This [c]ourt 
has previously commented on the frequency with which it has had to address the ‘acceptable 
limits of closing argument.’” (quoting United States v. Pierce, 792 F.2d 740, 742 (8th Cir. 
1986))); Daniel S. Medwed, Closing the Door on Misconduct: Rethinking the Ethical Standards 
That Govern Summations in Criminal Trials, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 915, 920 (2011) 
(“Prosecutorial over-reaching during closing argument is among the most common forms of 
error in criminal cases . . . .”); Rosemary Nidiry, Note, Restraining Adversarial Excess in 
Closing Argument, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1310 (1996) (“Prosecutorial misconduct in closing 
argument has been relatively well documented and extensively litigated.”). 
7. See, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1186 (1st Cir. 1993) (calling it 
“bedrock” that the prosecutor may not comment on the defendant’s right to remain silent). 
8. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295 (1986) (holding that prosecutor’s 
comment on the defendant’s post-arrest silence improper in cross-examination and closing 
argument); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 615–19 (1976) (“[U]se for impeachment purposes of 
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into the proceedings.9  These latter categories of forbidden summation are 
fundamentally sound prohibitions tied to the law, such as the defendant’s 
right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment.10  The former categories 
(vouching and personal opinions), as they are defined by many courts, can 
be untethered from the law and essentially constitute a code of politeness 
with fine distinctions which can often be discerned only after the fact.11  
The more damning critique made in this Article is that this code of 
politeness or good manners can be, in the extreme form adopted by some 
jurisdictions, essentially at war with the notion of argument itself.12  This 
extreme form, found in the rule that a lawyer may not comment on the 
credibility of the defendant or witnesses, forces the sides to avoid the 
central issues of the trial.  These issues often are the credibility of 
witnesses and the dueling narratives of truth presented by the parties 
which the jury must choose from.13 
This Article identifies another source of uncertainty in the law of 
closing arguments: appeals, subtle or otherwise, by the defense for jury 
nullification.  Jury nullification has a long history in the American legal 
system; a robust debate among scholars, practitioners, and even judges 
continues about whether jury nullification is ever proper, and if so, under 
what circumstances.  What cannot be denied is that jury nullification, or 
at least the potential for it, exists.14  Jury nullification exists in the 
shadows, generally unaddressed by the court during a trial, and it can rear 
its head in closing argument, where the defense has more latitude than in 
other parts of the trial.  The prosecutor is then left with a conundrum in 
how to respond.  The perceived injustice of the charging decision, of the 
 
petitioners’ silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
9. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 24–25 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Federal courts 
have long condemned racially inflammatory remarks during governmental summation.”).  
Although never reviewed and condemned by an appellate court, the defense argument in the 
civil rights-era Emmett Till murder trial was an extreme example of injecting racial prejudice 
into a closing argument.  Defense counsel said to the all-white jury, “every last Anglo-Saxon 
one of you has the courage to free these men,” and warned that their “forefathers would turn 
over in their graves if these boys were convicted on such evidence as this.”  Shaila Dewan & 
Ariel Hart, F.B.I. Discovers Trial Transcript in Emmett Till Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2005), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/18/us/fbi-discovers-trial-transcript-in-emmett-till-
case.html. 
10. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617–18. 
11. See infra Sections I.C.3–5. 
12. See infra Section I.C.5. 
13. See id. 
14. See Arie M. Rubenstein, Note, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the Modern 
Jury Trial, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 960 (2006) (noting that the phenomenon of jury 
nullification occurs when “some juries still acquit even when the evidence indicates that the 
defendant has violated the law”). 
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potential punishment to the defendant, or of the law itself may be the 
elephant in the room, but the prosecutor has limited means to address what 
may be on the minds of everyone in the courtroom. 
As a practicing prosecutor, I find all of this to be a problem that needs 
fixing.  Closing arguments are often the culmination of a long process that 
includes a police investigation, a grand jury investigation, a careful review 
of the charging decision by the prosecutor’s office, painstaking efforts to 
provide discovery to the defense, pretrial litigation in the form of motions 
to suppress evidence, the parties’ intensive preparation for trial, and the 
admission, at trial, of the government’s evidence that may support a 
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  The reversal of a conviction 
because of a misstep during summation, which may consist of a few words 
or phrases delivered inartfully and/or extemporaneously, is an outcome 
that should be avoided at all costs.  Of course, the prosecutor must be 
faithful to both the law and the ethics rules, but the solution does not lie 
in emphasizing the general maxims which tend to be exercises in circular 
reasoning.  Nor is it to be found, as some observers have suggested, in 
formulating slightly more specific “guidelines” for counsel to follow.15 
Instead, this Article argues that a firmer foundation is needed for the 
law of closing arguments, at least with respect to the admonitions against 
the expressions of personal opinion and vouching.  At present, many 
decisions about improper argument have a Justice Potter Stewart “I know 
it when I see it” quality,16 an approach that will continue to generate the 
uncertainty that produces frequent appellate litigation on the subject.  This 
Article proposes that the scope of closing argument should be governed 
by the scope of the earlier stages of the trial.  This would be a workable 
principle that would be fair to the parties and help guide the advocate 
trying her level best to seek justice.  Thus, if the trial has been a “he said, 
she said” controversy, it would be proper to address the credibility of 
witnesses head-on.  Likewise, if the defendant is charged with deliberately 
speaking untruths (i.e., lying), the prosecutor should be allowed to argue 
that the defendant was dishonest and untruthful without stepping through 
a minefield of forbidden and allowed verbal formulations. 
This principle would also help to prune the rule against expressions 
of personal opinion down to its essential core without ensnaring 
statements which articulate what is obvious—that is, the prosecutor trying 
the case believes the defendant to be guilty.  If the prosecutor seeks to 
 
15. See Michael J. Ahlen, The Need for Closing Argument Guidelines in Jury Trials, 70 
N.D. L. REV. 95, 105–07 (1994); Nidiry, supra note 6, at 1327–34. 
16. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (indicating he 
could not define hard-core pornography, but he knew it when he saw it). 
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assure the jury that there are facts known to him but not introduced during 
the trial which cinch the defendant’s guilt, that is clearly improper.  On 
the other hand, it should not matter that a prosecutor who sticks to arguing 
the case presented at trial has ventured into “I believe” or “I submit” 
statements. 
Finally, requiring the closing argument to mirror the scope of the trial 
would help address the issue of jury nullification in a constructive way.  
Many facts that go into the charging decision of the prosecutor’s office, 
or as the Supreme Court has termed it, the “moral[] reasonable[ness]” of 
a conviction,17 are not known to the jury.  If the moral righteousness of 
the case is to be contested during the trial, the prosecutor would have many 
things to say that would not be admitted into evidence under traditional 
notions of relevance.  When the defense suggests that a conviction is not 
just—as opposed to attacking the government’s evidence or its application 
to the law—it necessarily presents an incomplete picture.  A prosecutor 
arguing within the scope of the evidence presented at the trial is at a 
disadvantage when the defense does not do so.  At present, it is unclear 
how a prosecutor can respond to a plea for jury nullification, or how a jury 
is to consider such a plea. 
The “mirroring” principle presented in this Article is a coherent way 
for the trial judge to manage the presentation of evidence and the 
subsequent argument.18  It would also encourage the trial judge to think 
ahead to the closing argument.  In other words, if evidence about an issue 
is not presented or is precluded from being presented during the trial, the 
issue is not ripe for argument at the end of the trial.  Under this principle, 
the trial judge will ideally keep jury nullification out of the trial and 
instruct the jury to decide the case based on admitted evidence and 
applicable law.  To the extent the trial judge wishes to crack open the door 
to jury nullification, as some trial judges have, the mirroring principle 
forces the judge to think about whether to allow a fight on jury 
nullification on equal terms based on evidence presented at the trial.  The 
implications of doing this, which this Article explores, should give any 
trial judge pause before allowing a bald appeal for jury nullification. 
 
17. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 188 (1997). 
18. See infra Part III. 
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I. THE LAW OF CLOSING ARGUMENT 
A. The Prosecutor’s Charge 
The Supreme Court’s words in Berger v. United States about the 
heavy responsibilities and high purpose of a federal prosecutor have been 
cited in thousands of published cases and appellate briefs, attaining “near-
iconic status for its description of the prosecutor’s duty to serve justice, 
play by the rules, and not hit below the belt.”19  One of my former federal 
prosecutor colleagues had the words printed and taped to his office door—
a daily inspiration to all who passed by.  There has been no better 
statement about the role of the public prosecutor, and it came in a case 
involving improper closing argument by counsel for the government in a 
criminal case: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary 
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and 
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done.  As such, he is in a peculiar 
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which 
is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.  He may prosecute 
with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so.  But, while he 
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.  It is as 
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce 
a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
about a just one.20 
As an expression of the prosecutor’s purpose, it is perfect.  As a guide to 
argument during summations in a criminal trial, the distinction between 
“hard blows” and “foul ones” begs the question of what is foul and what 
is fair.  The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in a more 
recent case, has said that “[w]e start with certain fundamental verities.  ‘A 
prosecutor is permitted vigorous advocacy, so long as he does not stray 
into forbidden terrain.’”21  Such verities, repeated in similar form 
elsewhere,22 only warn the practitioner about the obvious—that there are 
 
19. Bennett L. Gershman, “Hard Strikes and Foul Blows:” Berger v. United States 75 
Years After, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 177, 178–79 (2010). 
20. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
21. United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 976 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Palmariello v. 
Superintendent of M.C.I. Norfolk, 873 F.2d 491, 494 (1st Cir. 1989)). 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 874 F.3d 236, 252 (5th Cir. 2017) (“‘[W]e allow 
prosecutors to use expressive language and “a bit of oratory and hyperbole” in 
arguments.’ . . .  At the same time, it is well-established that a prosecutor may ‘“not express his 
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limits in closing argument.  Such on the one hand–on the other hand 
formulations leave the reader thirsting for more clarification.23  Courts 
have reduced these general statements to some rules or maxims, such as 
the rule against vouching for a witness’s credibility, but as will be 
described below, these maxims have also been wanting.24  Elaboration on 
these standards has been left to case-by-case adjudication of alleged 
errors.25 
The law of closing arguments in criminal cases is essentially directed 
at prosecutors because, unlike a conviction, an acquittal cannot be 
appealed.26  A wrongful acquittal obtained from improper argument by 
defense counsel is as immune from appeal under the Double Jeopardy 
clause as an acquittal fairly won.27  It is in this vein that the rules developed 
for closing arguments are analyzed from the perspective of the prosecutor. 
B. The Prime Directive: Arguing Within the Evidence 
The purpose of this Article is not to canvass all of the rules governing 
closing arguments, but to concentrate on a couple which have been applied 
badly or are simply misconceived.  It is sensible to first examine the rule 
that the prosecutor (and defense counsel) should not argue facts outside 
the evidence introduced in court.28  This is the most basic rule of closing 
argument because it flows from the central assumption of our legal 
system: that the outcome of the case is to be determined based on the 
evidence presented in court at trial, judged against the legal standards 
 
personal opinion on the merits of the case or the credibility of witnesses.”’” (quoting United 
States v. Boyd, 773 F.3d 637, 645 (5th Cir. 2014))). 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659, 666 (5th Cir. 1979) (using a series of 
general oppositional statements to define prosecutor’s duty such as “[a] prosecutor can be 
vigorous without being venomous”). 
24. See generally Richard Collin Mangrum, I Believe, the Golden Rule, Send a Message, 
and Other Improper Closing Arguments, 48 CREIGHTON L. REV. 521 (2015) (discussing twelve 
principles concerning restrictions on closing arguments). 
25. Peter W. Agnes, Jr., An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure: A 
Collaborative Approach to Eliminate Improper Closing Arguments, 87 MASS. L. REV. 33, 36 
(2002). 
26. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975). 
27. See Nidiry, supra note 6, at 1300; see also Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313, 326 
(2013) (holding an acquittal based on error of law induced by the defendant himself still enjoys 
protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause). 
28. See Commonwealth v. Beaudry, 839 N.E.2d 298, 301–02 (Mass. 2005); see also 
Commonwealth v. Johnston, 7 N.E.3d 424, 444 (Mass. 2014) (“Argument based on facts not in 
evidence is improper.”); Commonwealth v. Storey, 391 N.E.2d 898, 906 (Mass. 1979) (“[I]t 
is . . . beyond dispute that a prosecutor commits error when he uses closing argument to argue 
or suggest facts not previously introduced in evidence.”). 
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supplied by the trial judge.29  As one commentator has put it, “When we, 
the inhabitants of the United States, want to resolve a legal dispute, we 
have a trial. . . .  We have relied on trials for our entire history as a 
nation.”30  Our entire books of state and federal rules of both criminal and 
civil procedure, our rules of evidence, and the guarantees of the 
Constitution of the United States concerning the rights of the accused all 
presuppose the existence of such a trial,31 as opposed to say, one of its 
predecessors, trial by battle.32  Having made the trial the central event of 
our legal process in criminal cases, it would be rather illogical to allow 
lawyers to argue facts that have not been brought into this carefully 
constructed proceeding. 
This rule, which I will call the “prime directive” because it flows from 
this first principle of how guilt and innocence is to be determined in our 
legal system, does not restrict the prosecutor to a mere recitation of the 
evidence.  The prosecutor is allowed to draw fair inferences from the 
evidence, to refer to the jury’s experience and common sense, and to use 
“‘analogy, example and hypothesis’” in aid of his or her argument.33  This 
rule against arguing outside the evidence is straightforward to apply 
because the latitude given to the advocate to make an argument is distinct 
from the prohibition against the advocate conjuring up facts not 
introduced at the trial. 
 
29. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986). 
Central to the right to a fair trial . . . is the principle that “one accused of a crime is 
entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the 
evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, 
continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.” 
Id. (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978)). 
30. Edward L. Rubin, Trial by Battle. Trial by Argument., 56 ARK. L. REV. 261, 261 
(2003). 
31. See generally Michael Sudman, The Jury Trial: History, Jury Selection, and the Use 
of Demonstrative Evidence, 1 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 172, 173–76 (1999) (tracing the 
tradition of the jury trial and trial rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Seventh Amendments of 
the United States Constitution). 
32. See Rubin, supra note 30, at 261 (contrasting modern trials with the medieval practice 
of trial by battle, whereby a legal dispute would be resolved through “armed conflict between 
two opponents”). 
33. Commonwealth v. Ridge, 916 N.E.2d 348, 368 (Mass. 2009) (quoting Leone v. Doran, 
292 N.E.2d 19, 31–32 (Mass. 1973), modified on other grounds, 297 N.E.2d 493 (Mass. 1973)); 
see Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function, Standard 3-6.8 to 3-6.9 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/
ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition/ [hereinafter Prosecution Function]. 
 
2 - GRANT. PUBLISHER READY 2.19.2019(DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019 10:36 PM 
2019] MIRRORING THE TRIAL 15 
C. The Rules Against Vouching and Personal Opinion 
1. Vouching: A Solid Core and Ambiguous Outer Layer 
The rules against vouching and expressions of personal opinion are 
separate, but they are treated together here because the misapplications of 
these rules share similar features.  In the classic form, improper vouching 
occurs when the prosecutor uses the prestige of his position or office to 
assure the jury the credibility of the government’s witnesses or other 
evidence,34 such as when the prosecutor assures the jury the police are 
telling the truth because he knows the officers and works with them.35  A 
prosecutor who argues for the credibility of police officers because they 
would not “put their pensions . . . on the line” to make a false case against 
a defendant is guilty of improper vouching because he is lending the 
prestige of the police department to the officers’ testimony.36  Similarly, 
vouching occurs when the prosecutor assures the jury that the police 
would not invent a case against the defendant because the police have so 
many real drug cases to investigate,37 or when the prosecutor tells the jury 
that the government would not put witnesses on the stand if they were 
lying.38 
This rule—and these obvious examples of vouching—are best 
understood as stemming from the restrictions of the “prime directive” 
discussed above.  In a true case of vouching, the prosecutor is taking the 
jury outside the evidence introduced at trial.39  If the prosecutor vouches 
for a police witness by noting his familiarity with the witness, he is 
invoking other cases and other sets of facts not relevant to the case against 
the particular defendant on trial.  The defense is ill-equipped to challenge 
these assurances because it would know little about the entire course of 
dealings between the prosecutor and the witness.  For example, putting an 
officer’s pension or job on the line necessarily raises questions about what 
the rules are for when an officer might lose her pension or job.40  These 
 
34. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Proper and Improper Closing Argument, 26 CRIM. JUST. 62, 
63 (2011). 
35. Agnes, supra note 25, at 43 n.87 (noting the temptation of prosecutors to vouch for 
the credibility of police officers they know well in drug cases). 
36. Commonwealth v. Kelly, 629 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (Mass. 1994) (alteration in original). 
37. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gallego, 542 N.E.2d 323, 325 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989). 
38. See, e.g., United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538, 556 (1st Cir. 1987). 
39. Mangrum, supra note 24, at 539 (quoting United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 133 
(3d Cir. 2012)) (noting that vouching occurs when prosecutor assures the jury of the credibility 
based on her “‘personal knowledge or by other information’” not contained in the record). 
40. Kelly, 629 N.E.2d at 1001–02 (explaining the impropriety of a prosecutor’s comments 
at closing argument suggesting that officers had risked their pensions by testifying). 
 
GRANT. MACRO. 2.3.2019 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019 10:36 PM 
16 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:7 
rules are collateral to the issues in the trial.  Likewise, an argument that 
invokes the scourge of drugs in the community at large is not pertinent to 
whether a particular drug defendant committed the charged crime.41  In 
each of these examples of improper vouching, the closing argument did 
not mirror the evidence at trial.42  The harm from such vouching is 
apparent.  Imagine for a moment the introduction of evidence and cross-
examination on these topics of argument—past cases, past dealings 
between the prosecutor and police officers, pensions, and the overall drug 
problem in the community—which would be necessary to make it a fair 
fight.  The trial would be sidetracked with, for example, a debate on just 
how drugs are affecting a particular community—the kind of complicated 
policy dispute that a trial is ill-equipped to resolve, let alone entertain, for 
the purpose of illuminating the issue of the officer’s credibility.43 
If courts found violations of the rule against vouching only when the 
prosecutor argued outside the evidence, then the boundary between proper 
and improper argument would be clear.  However, some courts have found 
vouching when it is plain that the prosecutor has done nothing more than 
argue inferences about evidence that was introduced at trial.44  In some 
formulations, vouching can occur even when the prosecutor argues facts 
adduced during trial but expresses a personal belief about a witness’s 
credibility or the evidence.45 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has gone 
further by stating that impermissible vouching can occur even where the 
prosecutor did not (a) “suggest that he had special knowledge about the 
witness[’s] credibility,” (b) indicate that special circumstances like the 
witness’s plea agreement guaranteed that the witness was credible or (c) 
express his personal belief about the witness’s truthfulness.46  
 
41. See, e.g., United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1153 (6th Cir. 1991) (providing one 
example of many cases condemning “war on drugs” rhetoric in closing arguments).  The Solivan 
court observed that this language is “designed to divert rather than focus the jury upon the 
evidence.”  Id. (citing United States v. Barlin, 686 F.2d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
42. See, e.g., Gallego, 542 N.E.2d at 325 (“Here the prosecutor departed from this case, 
where she belonged, to invoke supposed facts which were not only extraneous but carried the 
emotional charge of an overwhelming drug menace.”); see also Kelly, 629 N.E.2d at 1002 
(finding that the argument about pensions went outside the evidence found at trial). 
43. See, e.g., Gallego, 542 N.E.2d at 325 (including an argument about the drug problem 
generally in Boston). 
44. See, e.g., People v. Knapp, 624 N.W.2d 227, 241 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that 
an argument that the victim’s testimony was honest based on the evidence introduced during 
the trial was deemed to be vouching). 
45. See Medwed, supra note 6, at 919; see also Mangrum, supra note 24, at 539. 
46. United States v. Wihbey, 75 F.3d 761, 772 (1st Cir. 1996). 
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Nonetheless, the following prosecutor’s statement, “what they have done 
is testified truthfully” (referring to witnesses at the trial), was deemed to 
be “inappropriate,” albeit not reversible error.47 
This expansive notion of vouching ensnared another prosecutor when 
the First Circuit found that statements made in response to attacks on the 
credibility of the government’s witnesses “may have crossed the line into 
improper vouching.”48  The statement “the government suggests . . . that 
they were up there telling the truth,” was held not to have impacted the 
fairness of the trial and did not constitute plain error.49  The First Circuit 
has also admitted that “[t]he line between the legitimate argument that a 
witness’s testimony is credible and improper ‘vouching’ is often a hazy 
one.”50  When it said that the prosecutor’s fairly subdued, logical 
“statement that ‛[t]he testimony of the witnesses in this case is well 
corroborated . . . [a]nd as a result, you know that the witness’s testimony 
is true’—fell in the grey area.”51 
Commonwealth v. Caillot demonstrates the difficulty in applying a 
rule that conflates the prohibition against vouching with the rule against 
expressions of personal belief.52  In this case, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court stated its general rule that “[a] prosecutor engages in 
improper vouching if he ‘expresses a personal belief in the credibility of 
a witness, or indicates that he . . . has knowledge independent of the 
evidence before the jury.’”53  Caillot held, however, that the challenged 
statement—“[w]hat [the witness] did was he told the truth based on the 
evidence in this case, based on what could be corroborated”—would have 
been understood by the jury as an argument that the witness’s testimony 
was credible because it was corroborated by evidence admitted at the 
trial.54  As a result, it was not improper.  The court did say that the “better 
course” would have been to avoid using the phrase, “he told the truth.”55  
Although Caillot did not suggest a substitute phrasing, the prosecutor was 
justified in arguing that the witness told the truth, and a slightly different 
 
47. Id. (alteration in original). 
48. United States v. Sullivan, 85 F.3d 743, 751 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Wihbey, 75 F.3d at 
771–73). 
49. Id. 
50. United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 483 (1st Cir. 1993). 
51. Id. (alterations in original). 
52. Commonwealth v. Caillot, 909 N.E.2d 1, 14–15 (Mass. 2009). 
53. Id. at 14 (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Wilson, 693 N.E.2d 158, 
172 (Mass. 1998)). 
54. Id. at 14–15. 
55. Id. at 15. 
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formulation with the same meaning would have been, it seems, entirely 
proper.56 
The fine distinctions in cases like these show the difficulty in defining 
a rule against vouching when it is expanded beyond the logic of the prime 
directive.  Vouching that goes outside the evidence at trial represents a 
well-defined core to the rule.  Other vouching infractions exist in a “grey 
area,”57 in which courts are reluctant to reverse convictions where it is 
clear that the prosecutor was guilty of, at most, inartful phrasing that did 
not unfairly affect the trial.58 
This “grey area” of vouching is often subsumed within the separate 
rule against statements of personal belief.  For the sake of understanding 
this often murky area of the law, it would be best if the vouching rule were 
confined to vouching based on facts or reputation known outside the 
courtroom.59  Statements about the credibility of witnesses or the strength 
of the government’s case that are based on facts known inside the 
courtroom are better analyzed separately, as the American Bar 
Association’s (ABA) Standards for the Prosecution Function do.60  Such 
statements, whether they are deemed to be improper or not, should be 
tested against the rule that prohibits injecting personal opinions into 
closing argument. 
2. The Rule Against Personal Opinion 
Courts, commentators, and the American Bar Association have 
consistently articulated a distinct rule against the expression of personal 
opinions, separate and apart from arguing outside the evidence and 
vouching.61  It has been left to case-by-case adjudication to determine 
 
56. Id. 
57. United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 483 (1st Cir. 1993). 
58. See Agnes, supra note 25, at 34–35 (noting the reluctance of courts to reverse for 
certain types of closing argument errors). 
59. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 815 F.2d 818, 823 (1st Cir. 1987) (no improper 
vouching where “[t]he prosecutor did not ‘place the prestige of the government behind the 
witness’ nor indicate that ‘information not presented to the jury supports the testimony.’” 
(quoting United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 377 (11th Cir. 1983))). 
60. Prosecution Function, supra note 33, Standard 3-6.8(b) (“The prosecutor should not 
argue in terms of counsel’s personal opinion, and should not imply special or secret knowledge 
of the truth or of witness credibility.”). 
61. See Michael D. Cicchini, Combating Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Arguments, 
70 OKLA. L. REV. 887, 902 (2018); see also United States v. Rodriguez-Adorno, 695 F.3d 32, 
40–41 (1st Cir. 2012) (distinguishing the rule against personal opinion and the question of 
whether counsel’s argument implies knowledge unknown to the jury); United States v. Auch, 
187 F.3d 125, 131 (1st Cir. 1999) (articulating prohibitions against personal opinion and 
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what this prohibition adds to the law of closing argument.62  The First 
Circuit Court of Appeals has said that the prosecutor “may discuss the 
evidence, the warrantable inferences, the witnesses, and their 
credibility. . . .  [But h]e is not to interject his personal beliefs.”63  This 
formulation of the rule is not uncommon; courts generally state that the 
prosecutor may comment on evidence but may not offer a personal 
opinion about the evidence.64  But how is this to be done? 
The rule against personal opinion is frequently implicated when the 
prosecutor comments on the credibility of witnesses.65  These comments, 
unless made disingenuously or without any reflection by the prosecutor 
on whether she believes them (which would be unethical),66 do reflect her 
personal opinions.67  In some jurisdictions, the prosecutor is allowed to 
tread a narrow path between suggesting that certain witnesses are worthy 
of belief, if those suggestions do not appear to be the overt opinion of the 
prosecutor.68  In other jurisdictions, the artificiality of this distinction has 
been rejected in favor of a flat rule against commenting on a witness’s 
credibility.69  Both versions of this rule, as discussed below, seem to be 
unworkable. 
 
referring to facts outside the evidence); Prosecution Function, supra note 33, Standard 3-6.8 to 
3-6.10. 
62. See United States v. Farnkoff, 535 F.2d 661, 668 (1st Cir. 1976).  In one case, the First 
Circuit found error for an “indiscreet” statement even though it did not refer to facts outside the 
evidence.  Id.  The statement “I suggest to you, I ask you to consider these things, come to the 
decision which I think you should come to, based upon the evidence, that the defendant is guilty 
as charged” was improper because “[w]e have long put ourselves on record as disagreeing with 
those circuits which permit the prosecutor to add the weight of his own—or the government’s—
thumb to the scales of justice quite apart from any . . . connotation or implication of knowledge 
of additional facts.”  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Cotter, 425 F.2d 450, 453 
(1st Cir. 1970)). 
63. Cotter, 425 F.2d at 452. 
64. See Nidiry, supra note 6, at 1307–08; see also Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 921 N.E.2d 
968, 979 (Mass. 2010) (“The prosecutor should not have injected his personal observations or 
beliefs . . . .”); Commonwealth v. Finstein, 687 N.E.2d 638, 641 n.1 (Mass. 1997) (explaining 
that the trial judge gave specific guidance to counsel before closing arguments on how to avoid 
expressions of personal opinion). 
65. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Adorno, 695 F.3d at 40–41; Auch, 187 F.3d at 131–32. 
66. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
67. James W. Gunson, Prosecutorial Summation: Where is the Line Between “Personal 
Opinion” and Proper Argument?, 46 ME. L. REV. 241, 271 & n.176 (1994) (noting that “the 
prosecutor believes in the strength of the case” and that the criminal legal “process reinforces 
the prosecutor’s belief in the defendant’s guilt”). 
68. See infra Sections I.C.3–4. 
69. See infra Section I.C.5. 
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The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Young, 
confronted what it deemed to be improper arguments by both defense 
counsel and the federal prosecutor.70  The prosecutor responded to 
inflammatory rhetoric by defense counsel by engaging in a number of 
missteps: attacking defense counsel, putting untoward pressure on the jury 
by telling its members to “do your job,” and offering his “personal 
impressions.”71  The Young court found this conduct to be completely 
inappropriate, but not grounds for reversal.72  The Court acknowledged 
that “[t]he line separating acceptable from improper advocacy is not easily 
drawn; there is often a gray zone.”73  The Court made it clear, however, 
that there had been error,74 perhaps because there were several species of 
closing argument errors.  The Court found it easy to conclude that the 
prosecutor had violated the existing ABA standard, which prohibited the 
prosecutor from expressing “‘his or her personal belief or opinion as to 
the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the 
defendant’”75 since the prosecutor had explicitly offered his “personal 
impressions” about the evidence and the defendant’s guilt.76  Young made 
no attempt to signal whether the prosecutor could have properly given, in 
substance, the same view of the evidence without labeling them “personal 
impressions.”77 
3. Attempts by Federal Courts to Give Meaning to the Rule 
Against Personal Opinions 
A number of federal courts have taken the rule against personal 
opinions to be a matter of phraseology.78  In United States v. Nersesian, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the 
prosecutor had erred by repeatedly using “I” statements, that is, prefacing 
remarks about the evidence with, “I believe on the basis of what you’ve 
 
70. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 2 (1985). 
71. Id. at 17, 32. 
72. Id. at 16. 
73. Id. at 7. 
74. Id. at 34–35. 
75. Id. at 8 (quoting STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-5.8(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
1980)). 
76. Id. at 17. 
77. Id. 
78. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1387 (6th Cir. 1994) (drawing a 
distinction, although it was not dispositive on the facts, between “I suggest” and “I believe”).  
This section of the Article discusses in some depth several examples of this phenomenon from 
the First, Second, and Eighth Circuits. 
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heard.”79  Neresian also disapproved of the prosecutor posing questions 
such as “was [the witness] correct?” and answering that question in the 
affirmative.80  Acknowledging that the “[o]ccasional use of . . . rhetorical 
devices is simply fair argument,”81 the Second Circuit admonished 
prosecutors to use different language to make the same points: 
It is a perfectly acceptable practice for a prosecutor to use language in 
addressing the jury such as “you are free to conclude,” “you may 
perceive that,” “it is submitted that,” or “a conclusion on your part may 
be drawn,” to mention only a few examples of unobjectionable 
phraseology.  It is obligatory for prosecutors to find careful ways of 
inviting jurors to consider drawing argued inferences and conclusions 
and yet to avoid giving the impression that they are conveying their 
personal views to the jurors.82 
Neresian was a stand-alone “personal belief” rule violation: the prosecutor 
was arguing the evidence and was not vouching.  Neresian acknowledged 
that compliance with the rule was a matter of “phraseology” and not 
substance.  Using the passive voice “it is submitted” was proper but 
prefacing a sentence with “I submit” was not.83 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has, in similar 
fashion, sketched out a series of fine distinctions applying the rule against 
personal opinions where the prosecutor has not otherwise committed error 
by addressing facts outside the evidence.  Conclusory statements that the 
government has proven the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—
in the context of having argued the evidence introduced at trial—have 
been found to be error or very nearly error.84  When accompanied by the 
phrasing, “I think,” such a statement has been deemed to be a statement 
of personal belief.85  The First Circuit has noted that substituting “I think” 
with “[t]he government submits” would have fixed the problem.86 
 
79. United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1327–28 (2d Cir. 1987) (emphasis 
omitted). 
80. Id. at 1327 (alteration in original). 
81. Id. at 1328 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 
1181 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 1330.  Acknowledging the degree of this violation, the Second Circuit held that 
the closing argument errors, despite being numerous (the defense counted sixty-five) did not 
warrant reversal of the convictions.  Id. at 1327. 
84. United States v. Smith, 982 F.2d 681, 684 n.2 (1st Cir. 1993). 
85. See id. 
86. Id. 
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A prosecutor was found to have gone “too far” with first person 
statements like “I think her testimony was very clear” and “[i]t seems to 
me, and I submit to you, that [the witness] is right on the money.  Same 
guy, just thinner.”87  In this instance, the court noted the tension with 
another First Circuit case in which it said, “although it is the jury’s job to 
draw the inferences, there is nothing improper in the Government’s 
suggesting which inferences should be drawn.”88  The First Circuit did not 
attempt to elaborate on the distinction between properly suggesting what 
inferences should be drawn and improperly suggesting that a witness was 
“clear” or “right on the money.”  These latter statements, found to be error, 
were clearly within the context of an argument that a trial witness had 
accurately identified the defendant in a photo array.89  The critical factor, 
it seems, was the use of the first person in the statement. 
The First Circuit has, however, found error even where prosecutorial 
arguments were not couched in the first person.  In one case, a prosecutor’s 
argument that a witness had told the truth and had been an honest man in 
court was deemed to be improper personal opinion, even though, as the 
court acknowledged, it was in the context of defense arguments that the 
witness had lied.90  A prosecutor who asked and answered his own 
question—“Was [the passenger] credible?  Was he honest?  Of course, he 
was . . . .”—was held to have crossed the line in arguing for a witness’s 
credibility.91  Similarly, a prosecutor who claimed that “John Fitzgerald 
gave you honest, candid, truthful testimony” was found to be in error.92  
The First Circuit acknowledged that the statement was “not expressly a 
personal opinion and could have been intended, and perhaps understood, 
as merely a description of what the prosecutor was urging the jury to 
conclude based on the evidence.  And, in fairness, it followed a rather 
strong attack on Fitzgerald’s honesty in defense counsel’s own closing 
argument.”93  In the First Circuit, it appears that straightforward assertions 
of a witness’s credibility can transform an argument about the evidence 
into untoward expressions of personal opinion. 
In each of these examples, the First Circuit found error, but not 
reversible error.  In each case, the court analyzed the potential harm in 
terms of whether the prosecutor had suggested that he had knowledge of 
 
87. United States v. Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d 53, 67 (1st Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted). 
88. Id. (quoting United States v. Mount, 896 F.3d 612, 625 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
89. See id. 
90. See United States v. Auch, 187 F.3d 125, 131 (1st Cir. 1999). 
91. United States v. Rodriguez-Adorno, 695 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2012) (alteration in 
original). 
92. United States v. Gomes, 642 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 2011) (emphasis omitted). 
93. Id. 
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facts outside the record or had tried to use the prestige of the prosecutor’s 
office to bolster the argument.  In each case, these elements were lacking.  
Without these substantive concerns underlying these findings of 
prosecutorial misconduct, it is difficult to discern an organizing principle 
that justifies this rule.  Adding to the ambiguity in this area, the First 
Circuit has allowed the government to suggest inferences to the jury, 
which seem to permit the government to interpret and draw conclusions 
about a witness’s credibility or whether the government has met its burden 
of proof.94  For example, in arguing that a defendant knew he had 
transported stolen documents, a prosecutor asked and answered his own 
question: “Did Mr. Mount know that they were stolen when he brought 
them to Boston?  I suggest to you that the answer, again, is clearly yes.”95  
The prosecutor later prefaced his review of the evidence with, “How do 
we know that he stole the documents?”96  Thus, there was the use of the 
first person (“I” and “we”) and a conclusory statement of guilt—
formulations which have been condemned in other cases.97  Of course, the 
argument was tied to the evidence at trial, but then again, other similar 
arguments tied to the evidence have been censured by the First Circuit as 
prosecutorial error.98 
A series of cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit also demonstrate the fitful experience of federal courts 
attempting to allow argument about the credibility of witnesses while also 
giving stand-alone meaning to the rule against statements of personal 
belief.  A 1991 case, United States v. Freisinger, ruled that a prosecutor’s 
use in closing argument of the phrases “I submit that” and “I submit to 
you,” even though “couch[ed] . . . in less brazen language,” were still 
improper statements of personal opinion.99  Freisinger also disapproved 
of the assertion “[t]hey came here and told the truth.”100  The Eighth 
Circuit counseled that “[t]his kind of argumentation is not only improper, 
it is unnecessary.  Counsel can just as easily argue issues of credibility 
 
94. See, e.g., United States v. Barbosa, 666 F.2d 704, 709 (1st Cir. 1981) (“[T]he 
government told you [what] it was going to prove.  And that, in fact, is what the government 
proved.”). 
95. United States v. Mount, 896 F.2d 612, 625 (1st Cir. 1990). 
96. Id. 
97. See United States v. Carpenter, 736 F.3d 619, 632 (1st Cir. 2013) (allowing multiple 
statements of “that’s fraud” as “permissible comments on the evidence in the case”). 
98. See, e.g., United States v. Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d 53, 67 (1st Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Smith, 982 F.2d 681, 684 (1st Cir. 1993). 
99. See United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 386−87 (8th Cir. 1991). 
100. Id. at 386. 
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without injecting personal views.”101  Freisinger maintained that these 
first-person formulations and the conclusory statement of credibility 
“suggests that the government may know something that the jury does 
not,”102 but it made no attempt to articulate how, beyond the phraseology, 
the prosecutor was arguing outside the evidence.  If the solution was, as 
the Second Circuit suggested in Neresian, to switch from the first-person 
active voice to the passive voice, then it is hard to see how the prosecutor 
was arguing outside the evidence. 
However justified, Freisinger set a strict standard in how a prosecutor 
chooses her words.  Yet, the Eighth Circuit backtracked significantly from 
that approach in its 2004 and 2009 decisions.103  In each case, the 
prosecutor used the words “I submit” to preface remarks about the 
evidence.104  In the 2004 decision, United States v. Beaman, the Eighth 
Circuit found that this formulation, even though used eighteen times in 
summation, was not plain error.105  In a more nuanced reading of the rules 
against vouching and personal opinion, it said that using the “I submit” 
language was “a questionable practice because, depending on the context, 
it may either properly suggest how the jury should view the trial evidence, 
or improperly suggest that the government knows more than the jury has 
heard.”106  Because the prosecutor was “referring to testimony and other 
trial evidence,” it was not an obvious error, leaving unsaid whether it was 
error at all.107 
The 2009 decision, United States v. Bentley, went further in removing 
the automatic opprobrium given to first person statements.  It stated that 
while the use of the phrases “‘we know’ and ‘I submit.’ . . . has been often 
criticized (and discouraged) by this court and others, it is not always 
improper.”108  Acknowledging the per se disapproval given in Freisinger 
and the milder warning given in Beaman, the Eighth Circuit in Bentley 
said that this wording “is only improper when it suggests that the 
government has special knowledge of evidence not presented to the jury, 
carries an implied guarantee of truthfulness, or expresses a personal 
 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 386–87. 
103. United States v. Bentley, 561 F.3d 803, 803 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Beaman, 
361 F.3d 1061, 1061 (8th Cir. 2004). 
104. Bentley, 561 F.3d at 811; Beaman, 361 F.3d at 1065. 
105. Beaman, 361 F.3d at 1065. 
106. Id. 
107. See id. 
108. Bentley, 561 F.3d at 811. 
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opinion about credibility.”109  The Bentley court saw no problem with a 
chart used by the prosecutor to show the “ten things we learned during 
th[e] trial.”110  The prosecutor told the jury that “we know” a certain fact 
and then explained how each fact was based on evidence introduced 
during the trial.111  Using the words “I submit” to discuss the trial evidence 
was likewise deemed not to be error.112  Only the conclusory statement, 
“‘I submit he’s guilty of all crimes,’ approaches the line between proper 
and improper,” and it did not meet the plain error standard.113 
Subsequent decisions by the Eighth Circuit seem to have completed 
the evolution from a rule meant to censure certain forms of expression, to 
a far more pragmatic rule that looks to context and whether the argument 
strays from the evidence or seeks to leverage the prestige of the 
prosecutor’s office.114  Thus, using an “I” statement to say that a witness 
told the truth is now proper in the Eighth Circuit where the statement is 
simply a way of arguing the evidence: “I think it was very clear that he 
did as best he could to remember the dates, and times, the amounts.  And 
you’re the judges of his credibility, but based on that testimony, we ask 
that you believe him.”115  The allowance of such a statement can only be 
understood as the triumph of contextualized analysis over wooden rules 
focused on the form and not the substance of the prosecutor’s argument. 
4. The “L” Word in the Federal Courts: Per Se Misconduct or Fair 
Commentary 
The use in closing arguments of the “L” word, meaning “lie,” “lying,” 
or “liar,” has given rise to particular rules that vary across the federal 
circuits.  Stemming from the general rule against expressing personal 
opinions, the “liar” rule illustrates how courts have attempted to regulate 
closing argument both by the denomination of forbidden words and 
phrases and by a more contextual analysis. 
The First Circuit has adopted, and continues holding to, a per se rule 
that the prosecutor cannot call the defendant, or the defendant’s witnesses, 
 
109. Id. at 812. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. See id. 
113. See id. 
114. See United States v. Golliher, 820 F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding use of first-
person pronouns did not make statements into expressions of personal belief); United States v. 
Sevilla-Acosta, 746 F.3d 900, 905–06 (8th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the challenge to the prosecutor’s 
argument that used an analogy and first-person narrative to argue the evidence). 
115. Sevilla-Acosta, 746 F.3d at 906. 
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liars or argue that they lied in their testimony before the jury or in out-of-
court statements admitted into evidence.  In United States v. Rodriguez-
Estrada, the defendant was accused of a smorgasbord of crimes of 
dishonesty, and he was convicted of embezzlement, withholding 
information from a bankruptcy court, and false statements.116  The 
prosecutor argued that he was a “crook” and twice called the defendant a 
“liar.”117  The First Circuit did not elaborate on whether or not the labels 
were applied in the context of arguing the evidence of the alleged massive 
fraud, but said, “[t]hat these statements were improper is so clear as not to 
brook serious discussion.”118 
In 2018, faced with an invitation to revisit its per se rule against the 
“L” word, in light of the different approach taken by other circuits, the 
First Circuit held firm and expanded the prohibition to other witnesses 
called by the defendant.119  Thus, it was misconduct to say that the 
defendant, who gave inconsistent stories, was a “good storyteller” and that 
his testimony was “malarkey.”120  It was also error to say that the defense 
witness who changed his testimony during the trial on a crucial point was 
an “unmitigated liar.”121  The court refused to “condone” the use of “liar,” 
and it indicated that the use of other wording (“malarkey”) did not help.122  
The First Circuit, in finding the prosecutorial error harmless, noted that 
the use of these terms “were based on the inconsistency and 
outlandishness of [the defendant’s and the defendant’s witness’] stories, 
making it less likely that the jury would infer that the prosecutor had 
‘private knowledge of the defendant’s guilt.’”123  This made it clear that 
the violation was simply the use of the pejorative words, not any concern 
that the prosecutor was arguing outside the evidence, which ostensibly 
was the rationale for the “L” word rule in the first place.124 
In acknowledging that not all federal courts have adopted a per se rule 
against certain words, the First Circuit noted that many circuits are united 
 
116. United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 154–55 (1st Cir. 1989). 
117. Id. at 158. 
118. Id. 




123. Id. at 571 (quoting United States v. Gomes, 642 F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir. 2011)). 
124. See United States v. Garcia, 818 F.2d 136, 143–44 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[W]e think a 
prosecutor would be well advised to avoid directly accusing a defendant of lying—since jurors 
could believe the government has knowledge outside the evidence about the defendant’s 
veracity . . . .”). 
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in recognizing the context in which closing arguments are made.125  This 
was a curious way to attempt to find common ground since the First 
Circuit’s “L” word rule is meant to de-contextualize the analysis by 
establishing a prohibition that applies even where the evils of arguing 
outside the evidence or vouching are plainly absent.126  For its part, the 
Second Circuit has held that arguing that the testimony of a defense expert 
was “built on the lies of the defendant,”127 and that the expert’s process 
was “garbage in, garbage out” and did “not come within hailing distance 
of” constituting reversible error.128  It affirmed the use of the word “lie” 
so long as it is not inflammatory or intemperate and so long as the 
prosecutor is arguing the accuracy of underlying, contested facts.129  The 
Eighth Circuit found no misconduct in a fraud case when the prosecutor 
said that the defendant “exhibits all the signs of a liar” and accused the 
defendant of “still making false representations to [the jury] today.”130  
Other circuits have found the use of the word “lie” or its derivatives is not 
per se improper.131 
5. How Two Jurisdictions Have Given Expansive Scope to the 
Rule Against Expressions of Personal Belief 
The preceding discussion of how federal courts have grappled with 
the rule against personal opinions demonstrates the difficulty in 
developing a workable reading of this prohibition.  Two jurisdictions, 
Maine and Kansas, have taken the rule to perhaps its logical conclusion: 
a prohibition on arguing the credibility of the defendant or any other 
witness.132  This approach does not attempt to square the rule against 
personal opinions with the allowance of argument about the credibility of 
witnesses.  It eschews both the fraught exercise of picking through 
forbidden and permitted phrases, as well as the fully contextualized 
analysis based on compliance with the prime directive. 
 
125. Saad, 888 F.3d at 570. 
126. Id. at 571 (finding no prejudice because there was no suggestion the prosecutor had 
suggested he had information unknown to the jury but still demining it inappropriate). 
127. Brief for the United States of America at 50, United States v. Coriaty, 300 F.3d 244 
(2d Cir. 2002) (No. 01-1450), 2002 WL 32297937, at *50. 
128. United States v. Coriaty, 300 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2002). 
129. See id. at 255–56. 
130. United States v. Shoff, 151 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 1998) (alteration in original). 
131. See, e.g., United States v. Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 
cases in other circuits). 
132. See Gunson, supra note 67, at 241–43; Steven Leben, Commenting on Credibility in 
Kansas: A Constructive Criticism of State v. Pabst, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 871, 871 (2008). 
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a. Maine: “My confusion is, what can we say?”133 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court issued three decisions in a nine-
month period during 1993 and 1994 which vacated convictions due, in 
whole or in part, to what it found to be the expression of personal opinion 
by prosecutors in closing argument.134  In two of the three cases, the 
prosecutor also engaged in clearly improper cross-examination by asking 
the testifying defendant whether one or more prosecution witnesses, who 
offered different versions of events than the defendant, were lying.135  This 
raised the question of whether the closing argument mis-steps, standing 
alone, might have constituted harmless error, but the Maine court left no 
doubt that the closing remarks were error.136 
In State v. Tripp, the defendant was charged with sexually assaulting 
his nine-year old son.137  His son and an outcry witness described the 
alleged rapes in detail, and the defendant took the stand and firmly denied 
that these events took place.138  The defendant went further and suggested 
a motive for the son to fabricate a story.139  During closing arguments, 
both the prosecutor and the defense attorney noted the obvious conflict in 
testimony and said that one of them, the defendant or the son, was lying, 
with each advocate having a different view of who was lying.140  The 
prosecutor also maintained that the son “told you the truth.  He told you 
what happened to him.  He told you what his father did to him.”141  Tripp 
held that by arguing both that the son was telling the truth and that the 
defendant was lying, “the clear implication [was] that the prosecutor 
believed that the victim told the truth but defendant lied.”142 
State v. Steen, another sexual assault case, stated flatly that “it is 
impermissible for a prosecutor to assert that the defendant lied on the 
stand.”143  It cited a prior case, State v. Smith, in which the Maine court 
 
133. Gunson, supra note 67, at 242 n.15 (quoting Jason Wolfe, Maine High Court Cracks 
Down on Prosecutors’ Trial Remarks, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 8, 1994, at 8A). 
134. See generally Robert W. Clifford, Identifying and Preventing Improper 
Prosecutorial Comment in Closing Argument, 51 ME. L. REV. 241, 244–49 (1999). 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 245–48 (suggesting that improper cross-examination was the more serious error 
in two of the three cases). 
137. State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d 1318, 1319 (Me. 1994). 
138. Id. at 1319. 
139. Id. at 1321. 
140. See id. at 1320–21. 
141. Id. at 1321 (emphasis omitted). 
142. Id. 
143. State v. Steen, 623 A.2d 146, 149 (Me. 1993). 
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had offered a more nuanced, if elusive, view of the rule against personal 
opinions: 
Although the prosecutor may properly attack defendant’s credibility 
by analyzing the evidence and highlighting absurdities or 
discrepancies in defendant’s testimony, and may present his analysis 
in summation with vigor and zeal, he may not properly convey to the 
jury his personal opinion that a defendant is lying.144 
The combined effect of Steen and Tripp seemed to extinguish any daylight 
that might have previously existed between properly attacking the 
defendant’s credibility and improperly offering a personal opinion of the 
defendant’s credibility.  Any comment on whether the defendant’s 
testimony was truthful was prohibited.  Steen went further still by holding 
that the prosecutor’s argument on the credibility of the defendant’s expert 
witness was improper.145  By saying “I suggest to you, ladies and 
gentlemen, that his opinion is based on $2,500, the money the defendant 
paid him for his testimony,” the prosecutor had “clearly suggested” that 
the expert had lied.146  The zone of protection from prosecutorial argument 
thus expanded from the defendant himself to the defendant’s witnesses. 
The third case, State v. Casella, was a 4-3 decision in a fraud case in 
which the defendant testified.147  There was no claim of improper cross-
examination.  Instead, the prosecutor asserted in closing argument that the 
defendant had lied in court just as he had lied to his victims in order to 
obtain their money.148  The majority opinion counted forty-one times the 
prosecutor had used the words lie, lying, and liar.149  It did not matter, as 
the dissent pointed out, that this occurred all in reference to evidence 
introduced about his fraudulent activities and the defendant’s in-court 
testimony.150  Casella said, “[w]e have repeatedly held that it is improper 
for a prosecutor to express an opinion on the credibility of a defendant.”151  
The government contended on appeal that the attack on the defendant’s 
credibility was permissible because “its closing argument was based on 
 
144. State v. Smith, 456 A.2d 16, 17 (Me. 1983). 
145. Steen, 623 A.2d at 149. 
146. Id. at 149 (emphasis omitted).  The prosecutor probably would have conceded that 
he had been suggesting that the witness had given false testimony because it was influenced by 
the $2,500 fee.  See id. 
147. State v. Casella, 632 A.2d 121, 121–22 (Me. 1993). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 121. 
150. Id. at 125 (Roberts, J., concurring). 
151. Id. at 122. 
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the facts in evidence and thus was not improper.”152  The court disagreed.  
In distinguishing a prior decision which had suggested that referring to the 
defendant as an “admitted liar” was allowed, Casella said that such 
commentary was appropriate only if the defendant himself had admitted, 
on the stand, to lying.153  If the truthfulness of the defendant’s testimony 
was a matter of dispute, then the prosecutor could not give his view of 
whether the defendant had lied.154 
These decisions caused consternation among prosecutors in Maine,155 
prompting one elected District Attorney to ask, “My confusion is, what 
can we say?”156  One commentator, although critical of the decisions, 
recognized that the decisions had redefined the rule against personal 
opinion in Maine.157  According to the commentator, the cases “place[d] 
the prosecutor in the impossible position of being prohibited from 
commenting either directly or implicitly on a testifying defendant’s 
credibility,” even where the defendant had contradicted the government’s 
witnesses.158  Justice Robert Clifford, who dissented in Tripp and Casella, 
wrote an article analyzing these decisions and other closing argument 
cases in Maine.159  While attempting to harmonize Steen, Tripp, and 
Casella with prior decisions that allowed some room for argument on 
matters of credibility of the defendant or his witnesses, Justice Clifford 
recognized that this trilogy represented a different approach to the rule 
against personal opinion.160  He suggested that the results could have 
changed with some tweaking of the prosecutor’s phraseology, consistent 
with many of the federal court decisions discussed above.  In other words, 
the prosecutor could argue that the defendant or a defense witness was 
lying or that a government witness was truthful by saying, “‘I submit that 
 
152. Id. at 123. 
153. See id. 
154. Id. (citing State v. Steen, 623 A.2d 146, 149 (Me. 1993)). 
155. Clifford, supra note 134, at 241. 
156. Gunson, supra note 67, at 242 n.15 (emphasis added). 
157. See id. at 242–43. 
158. Id. at 279. 
159. See Clifford, supra note 134. 
160. Id. at 242.  Justice Clifford said, with some diplomacy, that,  
[E]xcept in a few of its opinions, particularly Casella, and a 1983 case, State v. 
Smith, when emphasis was placed on the pejorative language used by the 
prosecutors without full consideration of the context in which the language was 
used, the court has correctly addressed the cases that have come before it. 
Id. (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
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a witness is not credible,’ or ‘I suggest that our witness is telling the 
truth.’”161 
While these distinctions in verbal formulation might have been 
important to Justice Clifford, the logic of Steen, Tripp, and Casella 
suggests that making minor changes to the form, but not the substance, of 
the closing argument would be insufficient.162  Moreover, Casella had 
batted away the government’s contention that the closing argument was 
proper so long as it was grounded in the evidence introduced at trial.  
Because “[i]t was for the jury, not the prosecutor, to determine which 
witnesses were telling the truth,” the topic was off-limits.163  The rule 
against personal opinion had clearly gone beyond the prohibition against 
arguing outside the evidence and had been given independent significance 
by prohibiting altogether remarks about the credibility of defense 
witnesses.164 
b. Kansas:The end of argument for both sides? 
The Kansas Supreme Court touched the apogee of restrictions on 
closing argument when in 2000 it flatly stated “that it is improper for a 
lawyer to comment on a witness’[s] credibility.”165  In that case, State v. 
Pabst, the prosecutor contended in closing argument that the defendant, 
who had testified on his own behalf in a murder trial, had lied.166  This 
testimony was central to the case.167  Pabst admitted he shot his fiancée to 
death but laid out a scenario that made the shooting into an accident.168  
This contradicted the physical evidence in the case and formed the basis 
for the prosecutor’s argument that the accident story was a fiction.169  
After couching the accusation of lying in the first person—“I look into 
each one of your eyes and I tell you he lied”—the defense objected, and 
 
161. Id. at 263 (citation omitted). 
162. But see id.  Ironically, the “I suggest” language would probably draw a rebuke among 
courts that apply the rule against personal opinion as a rule of forbidden or allowable verbal 
formulations.  The use of the first person, standing alone, has proven fatal for several closing 
arguments, as discussed above. 
163. See State v. Casella, 632 A.2d 121, 123 (Me. 1993). 
164. See id. (rejecting government’s argument that it was enough that the prosecutor 
engaged in fair comment on the evidence). 
165. State v. Pabst, 996 P.2d 321, 326 (Kan. 2000). 
166. Id. at 324–26. 
167. See Leben, supra note 132, at 872 (“[T]he key question for the jury to determine was 
whether there was any shred of truth in anything that the defendant said had occurred.”). 
168. Pabst, 996 P.2d at 324. 
169. See id. at 324–26. 
 
GRANT. MACRO. 2.3.2019 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019 10:36 PM 
32 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:7 
the trial court sustained the objection.170  The prosecutor rephrased his 
remarks by saying, “The State tells you he lied,” which the trial judge 
permitted.171 
The Kansas Supreme Court said the eleven references to the 
defendant lying were prosecutorial misconduct requiring a new trial, 
regardless of whether the remarks about lying were phrased in the first 
person or third person.172  Pabst might have applied the rule against 
personal opinion to reach this result by pointing to the use of the first 
person, or it might have defined the prosecutor’s sin as simply using the 
“L” word.  Or, it might have applied the rule against vouching to find that 
the assurance—“[w]e didn’t lie to you[, w]e didn’t hide anything”173—
had improperly placed the government’s witnesses and the government on 
one righteous team.  Instead, Pabst held that the prosecutor erred because 
Kansas’s Rules of Professional Responsibility (which are based on the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct) and the ABA’s Standards for 
Prosecutors “clearly and unequivocally say that it is improper for a lawyer 
to comment on a witness’[s] credibility.”174  It specifically overruled its 
own precedent, State v. McClain, which had said, “[c]ounsel may 
comment on the credibility of a witness where his remarks are based on 
the facts in evidence.”175 
This was the broadest possible holding, and because it was grounded 
in the ethical rules applicable to all lawyers, it applies to criminal defense 
lawyers.  Pabst could have said that lawyers can comment on credibility 
issues, but that those words, in this context, were personal opinions.  By 
removing the credibility of witnesses from the arena of closing argument, 
Pabst avoided the spectacle of condemning one verbal formulation but 
endorsing another formulation that says the same thing.  Of course, it is 
worth asking what is left of closing argument if the lawyers cannot address 
whether the witnesses are telling the truth or not.  In Pabst itself, what did 
the Kansas Supreme Court think the lawyers were going to talk about in 
their summations, if not the plausibility of the defendant’s accident 
scenario?  Pabst admitted that the defendant’s “credibility was crucial to 
the case.”176 
 
170. Id. at 325. 
171. Id. 
172. See id. at 325–26. 
173. Id. at 325 (emphasis omitted). 
174. Id. at 326. 
175. Id. (quoting State v. McClain, 533 P.2d 1277, 1282 (Kan. 1975)). 
176. Id.  Yet, because it was so crucial, the Supreme Court of Kansas said it was important 
for the prosecutor not to comment on it.  Id.  It claimed that the arguments about the defendant 
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Pabst’s broad construction of the rule against personal opinion, if 
taken seriously, would probably mean the end of closing argument as it 
has long been practiced, a solution akin to curing the disease by killing the 
patient.  A Kansas intermediate appellate judge who has had to apply the 
Pabst rule has written an article arguing that, in practice, the prohibition 
against commenting on witness credibility is unworkable.177  At a 
fundamental level, Pabst is inconsistent with the whole idea of a trial: 
“Credibility is at the heart of any trial.  If all of the witnesses agreed upon 
all of the facts, no factual disputes would be submitted to a judge or 
jury.”178  Moreover, the rule would prevent defense counsel from attacking 
the credibility of the government’s witnesses, an outcome that would seem 
to infringe on the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.179  In practice, the 
“trial judge’s task of policing Pabst violations in closing argument in the 
absence of objections is not one that can be handled without error.”180  
Post-Pabst, it was held in State v. Miller, a murder case, to be misconduct 
for the prosecutor to refer to what “the killer” did in a sequence of events 
leading up to the death in question.181  In a case decided a year later, 
repeated suggestions that the defendant was “the killer” were held not to 
be error.182 
If Pabst held the promise of establishing a reasonably clear rule by 
cordoning off an entire area of the trial from comment, it does not appear 
that the promise has been fulfilled.  Trials in Kansas continue to place the 
credibility of witness testimony in front of the jury183 and lawyers are 
compelled to address the elephant in the room.184 
 
lying amounted to “unsworn testimony,” adding that “[s]tating facts not in evidence is clearly 
improper.”  Id.  To characterize the prosecutor’s remarks as both untoward opinion and factual 
testimony was a head-scratching turn of logic. 
177. Leben, supra note 132, at 871. 
178. Id. at 879. 
179. Id. at 893–96. 
180. Id. at 897. 
181. Id. at 897–98; see State v. Miller, 163 P.3d 267, 292–95 (Kan. 2007). 
182. Leben, supra note 132, at 897–98; see State v. Scott, 183 P.3d 801, 823 (Kan. 2008). 
183. In State v. Elnicki, 105 P.3d 1222, 1233–34 (Kan. 2005), the defendant’s version of 
events at issue during a sexual assault trial, where the defendant gave mutually exclusive 
versions of events, warranted reversal because the prosecutor referred to the defendant’s 
inconsistent statement as a “fairy tale,” “fabrication,” and a “tall tale.”  Id. at 133–34.  In State 
v. Hernandez, No. 107,288, 2013 WL 4046398, at *1, *4 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2013), the 
court allowed the following argument despite the ruling in Pabst: “[H]e’s counting on you not 
to believe them because after all, they are just children.  But you should.  And if you do, you 
will find him guilty.”  Id. 
184. Leben, supra note 132, at 879. 
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II. JURY NULLIFICATION IN CLOSING ARGUMENT 
This Article turns to another elephant in the room, jury nullification, 
which will be defined for purposes of this discussion to be a jury verdict 
that is not based on, and is contrary to, the evidence introduced during the 
trial and the law as explained to the jury by the trial judge.185  In criminal 
cases, a jury nullification argument is usually understood as a defense 
argument for acquittal in spite of the evidence.186  Jury nullification often 
creeps into the trial during closing argument because the prior stages of 
the trial are confined to matters introduced into evidence and the law 
explained by the judge.187 
This section will explore, through a few examples, the conundrum 
prosecutors are faced with when they confront a jury nullification 
argument by the defense.  This conundrum helps to explain the “why” 
behind some forms of prosecutorial argument that are later deemed error. 
A. The Ambiguous Place of Jury Nullification in Criminal Cases 
Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
criminal defendants are entitled to jury trials for felonies, and the judge 
cannot direct a verdict in favor of the government, even if the evidence is 
overwhelming on one or all of the counts.188  As a result, jurors have the 
unreviewable power to ignore the law and the facts and render a verdict 
aligned to their sense of justice, or for some other reason.189  It has long 
been established that jurors cannot be forced to explain their verdicts, and 
they cannot be punished for what the court or anyone else believes is even 
a manifestly erroneous decision.190  The government has no ability to 
appeal or obtain a retrial where a verdict was erroneous.191  On the other 
 
185. See, e.g., United States v. Leach, 632 F.2d 1337, 1341 n.12 (5th Cir. 1980). 
186. See Robert E. Korroch & Michael J. Davidson, Jury Nullification: A Call for Justice 
or an Invitation to Anarchy?, 139 MIL. L. REV. 131, 132 (1993). 
187. See Pamela Baschab, Jury Nullification: The Anti-Atticus, 65 ALA. LAW. 110, 114 
(2004) (describing how defense attorneys attempt to subtly argue for jury nullification in 
opening or closing statements). 
188. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993). 
189. Korroch & Davidson, supra note 186, at 131–32. 
190. Todd E. Pettys, Evidentiary Relevance, Morally Reasonable Verdicts, and Jury 
Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 467, 498–99 (2001). 
191. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 210 (1984) (holding that a capital sentencing 
proceeding was deemed a trial and subject to the Double Jeopardy clause, even where acquittal 
in the sentencing proceeding was based on legal error); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 
352 (1975) (“A system permitting review of all claimed legal errors would have symmetry to 
recommend it and would avoid the release of some defendants who have benefited from 
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hand, juries are, with the exception of a few state courts, told that they 
have a duty to follow the law as it is given to them, and to apply the facts 
to that law, based on the evidence admitted at trial.192  They are not told 
about their power to nullify, nor are they given instructions to guide them 
should they decide to entertain nullification.193 
Thus, as one commentator has said, “[J]ury nullification ultimately 
exists in the ‘twilight’ between judicial condemnation and permission—
judges strongly denounce the practice but are unable to control it.”194  It 
has been clear since the 1895 case, Sparf v. United States, that judges, not 
juries, decide questions of law.195  Thus, the defendant in Sparf had no 
right to an instruction on a lesser-included offense unless the law 
supported it.196  Federal courts have been consistent that the defendant has 
no right to a verdict based on jury nullification,197 or even the right to 
pursue such a verdict.198 
To say that the defendant has no right to jury nullification still leaves 
the possibility that the jury may choose to grant a nullification verdict.  It 
is in this realm that defendants and their lawyers do, rather routinely, seek 
to inject the possibility of jury nullification into trials.  As one experienced 
Alabama judge has written: 
Many defense attorneys argue for nullification during opening or 
closing statements.  Is it permissible for the jury to be made aware of 
its power to nullify?  Most competent defense attorneys will figure a 
way to get this issue in front of the jury without going so far as to be 
 
instructions or evidentiary rulings that are unduly favorable to them.  But we have rejected this 
position . . . .”). 
192. United States v. Desmarais, 938 F.2d 347, 350 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that the jury 
must be instructed to follow the law); United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 
1969) (asserting that the jury has duty to apply the law and should be instructed to do so); Robert 
P. Lawry, The Moral Obligation of the Juror to the Law, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 137, 138 n.3 
(2007). 
193. See Korroch & Davidson, supra note 186, at 131–33; see also United States v. Carr, 
424 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 
1996)) (noting that every federal circuit agrees that there is no right for jury to be instructed on 
nullification). 
194. Kimberly Del Frate, Comment, The Elephant in the Room: Attorney Accountability 
for Jury Nullification Arguments in Criminal Trials, 52 CAL. W. L. REV. 163, 172 (2016). 
195. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 99–101 (1895). 
196. See id. at 63–64. 
197. See, e.g., Crease v. McKune, 189 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Horsman, 114 F.3d 822, 829 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105–06 
(11th Cir. 1983). 
198. See United States v. Thompson, No. 99-41007, 2001 WL 498430, at *16 (5th Cir. 
Apr. 9, 2001); Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1994). 
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held in contempt of court.  Such arguments as those aimed at evoking 
sympathy for the client or reviewing the historical role of the jury or 
even as “send a message” may be subtle enough to escape detection 
or judicial consequences.  A defense attorney who, based on the facts, 
has no defense will usually take a plea bargain.  If that is not possible, 
he may throw his client’s case on the mercy of the jury. 
Then the client’s best or only defense is to urge the jury to nullify.  
Blatant tactics would evoke possible ethical considerations and may 
also result in contempt.  The defense attorney can still walk a thin line 
and weave the nullification notion throughout his case.  That notion is 
that even though his client did the deed, it would be an injustice to 
convict him.199 
Other practitioners and scholars have noted the frequency of appeals to 
jury nullification in criminal trials.200  In my nearly twenty years as a 
federal prosecutor in the District of Columbia and Massachusetts, I have 
noticed that nearly every criminal trial has, to a lesser or greater degree, 
an element of appeal to jury nullification. 
A federal trial court may act in three possible ways.  First, the trial 
judge may actually be sympathetic to a verdict based on jury nullification 
and wish to open the door fully to that possibility by instructing the jury 
on factors other than the elements of the charged crime and allowing the 
jury to consider the possible punishment and decide, whether in light of 
that punishment, a guilty verdict would be just.201  In the last twenty years, 
at least three federal district judges have proposed doing just that, either 
in litigation or in scholarly commentary, but federal appellate courts have 
 
199. Baschab, supra note 187, at 114. 
200. See Douglas E. Litowitz, Jury Nullification: Setting Reasonable Limits, 11 CHI. B. 
ASS’N REC. 16, 16–17 (1997) (noting phenomenon of jury nullification in high profile cases); 
Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 987–88 & n.203 (“Realistic observers have noted that defense 
attorneys already routinely argue for nullification, though in couched terms.”). 
201. See Jonathan Bressler, Reconstruction and the Transformation of Jury Nullification, 
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1133, 1140–41 (2011) (describing the effort of a federal district judge to 
inform the jury of the mandatory minimum sentence faced by the child pornography defendant 
so that the jury could decide whether to nullify the law—the judge’s effort was thwarted by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit); Korroch & Davidson, supra note 186, 
at 138 (describing a federal trial resulting in an acquittal in which the trial judge “permitted 
nullification-related voir dire, a nullification instruction, and nullification argument in a 
prosecution for operating an illegal gambling business”) (footnote omitted).  See generally Del 
Frate, supra note 194, at 180–81; Donald M. Middlebrooks, Reviving Thomas Jefferson’s Jury: 
Sparf and Hanson v. United States Reconsidered, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 353 (2004) 
(illustrating a federal district judge’s argument, that juries should not be told that they have a 
duty to follow the law). 
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not been kind to this approach.202  As a result, this is apt to be the rare 
case. 
The second possibility is that the trial judge will instruct the jury that 
it must acquit the defendant if the government has not proven its case 
beyond a reasonable doubt, but that it should convict the defendant if the 
government has met its burden of proof.203  This instruction opens the door 
just a crack to a verdict based on jury nullification.  In affirming an 
instruction using a “must/should” formulation, the First Circuit noted the 
“contrast in directives” and acknowledged that “together with the court’s 
refusal to instruct in any detail about the doctrine of jury nullification, [it] 
left pregnant the possibility that the jury could ignore the law if it so 
chose.”204  In this second scenario, the trial judge may, but is not required 
to, take measures to block the assertion of a jury nullification defense.205 
The third possibility is that the federal trial judge gives a “must/must” 
instruction, for example, that the jury must acquit if it finds the 
government has not carried its burden of proof, and it must convict if it 
finds the government has proven the charged crimes beyond a reasonable 
doubt.206  This instruction attempts to shut the door, to the extent the trial 
judge can, to a verdict based on jury nullification.  Again, the trial judge 
is permitted, but is not forced, to prevent jury nullification arguments.207 
B. The Prosecutor Responding to Jury Nullification in Closing 
Argument 
A federal prosecutor confronts, in closing argument, the potential for 
jury nullification in every case.  The trial judge, in the rare case, may 
actively promote that possibility.208  Far more likely, the trial judge’s 
 
202. Bressler, supra note 201, at 1140–42 (explaining that federal district judges Jack 
Weinstein and Gerald Lynch were reversed on appeal after they sought to allow jury 
nullification in separate criminal cases).  Federal district judge Donald Middlebrooks has 
defended jury nullification in a scholarly article.  Id.  See generally Middlebrooks, supra note 
201. 
203. See, e.g., United States v. Appolon, 695 F.3d 44, 65 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1189–90 (1st Cir. 1993). 
204. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1190. 
205. See id. 
206. United States v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213, 221 (2d Cir. 2005) (agreeing with United States 
v. Pierre, 974 F.2d 1355, 1356–57 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam), that the trial judge may instruct 
the jury that it is their duty to convict if they find the government has met its burden of proof). 
207. See Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1190; see also United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 
616–18 (2d Cir. 1997) (suggesting that courts have a duty to prevent jury nullification). 
208. Legal scholars have been rather sympathetic to allowing jury nullification to have an 
explicit part in our criminal legal process.  See Bressler, supra note 201, at 1139 (“[S]cholars 
almost unanimously agree that when the Constitution and Sixth Amendment were ratified in the 
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action will range from subtly acknowledging this possible outcome, by 
the use of the pregnant negative in a “must/should” instruction, to an 
admonition not to engage in jury nullification and active steps to prevent 
it from happening.209 
All of the foregoing is meant to show that jury nullification injects an 
element of ambiguity into closing arguments.  At trial, the ethical 
prosecutor wishes to do no more than obtain a conviction based strictly on 
the evidence introduced at trial and the jury instructions about to be given 
by the trial judge.  But the chance of jury nullification means that the battle 
during closing arguments may not be fought strictly on those terms, 
depending on how the defendant approaches the case. 
The defense might encourage acquittal because of how the case was 
charged, for example, whether the charges seem disproportionate to the 
defendant’s moral culpability,210 or the seemliness of allowing some 
leniency to cooperating witnesses who have been charged, or the decision 
not to charge a witness at all.211  The defense may try to claim the 
punishment for the crime is unfair,212 or seek to emphasize her client’s 
contributions to society,213 or seek to portray the fact that the defendant is 
a “sympathetic figure” who had previously suffered childhood abuse.214  
The realm of argument based on jury nullification is as broad as defense 
counsel’s inventiveness. 
Arguments for jury nullification can lead to responses from 
prosecutors that can give rise to claims of inappropriate arguments.  In the 
seminal Supreme Court case of United States v. Young, discussed earlier 
in this Article, the defense attorney, after having heard a summary of the 
evidence by the prosecutor, launched personal attacks at the prosecutor, 
intimated that the prosecution deliberately withheld exculpatory evidence, 
 
late eighteenth century, the jury was understood to have the right, not merely the power, to 
decide questions of law—and thus to nullify.”).  This may portend a movement among judges 
and practitioners to accept this practice in the future. 
209. See supra Section II.A. 
210. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 596 F.3d 1228, 1237–38 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(stating that the defendant maintained he was a lesser player in a conspiracy and acknowledged 
on appeal that he sought jury nullification because he could not satisfy the elements of a 
withdrawal defense). 
211. See, e.g., United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 676–77 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that the 
defense argued that the lack of prosecution of the government’s witnesses who got a “free ride” 
should be basis for acquittal). 
212. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, No. 05-12835, 2007 WL 177734, at *842, *846–
47 (11th Cir. Jan. 25, 2007). 
213. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, 567 Fed. Appx. 844, 849 (11th Cir. 2014). 
214. See, e.g., United States v. Horsman, 114 F.3d 822, 829 (8th Cir. 1997). 
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and directly asserted that the prosecutor in the courtroom did not believe 
the defendant had intended to defraud anyone, an essential element to the 
charged crime.215  The federal prosecutor, as the Young court found, 
engaged in improper argument to respond to the defense attorney’s 
improper argument.216  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger 
observed that the situation “was but one example of an all too common 
occurrence in criminal trials—the defense counsel argues improperly, 
provoking the prosecutor to respond in kind.”217 
Without defending the prosecutor’s argument in Young, it is fair to 
say he was faced with implicit arguments for jury nullification; that is, 
arguments outside the law and evidence.  For example, on the claim that 
the prosecutor had withheld evidence, the exchange of discovery is not 
relevant to the issues at trial and is regulated outside the hearing of the 
jury by the judge.218  An invitation to acquit because the prosecutor 
subjectively knew that the defendant lacked the requisite mens rea was 
outside the evidence because the prosecutor could not have testified at the 
trial and the jury did not know the prosecutor’s internal thought process.  
For both of these arguments, there was nothing properly in the record with 
which to respond.  On the horns of that dilemma, the prosecutor, according 
to the Court, crossed the line with unprofessional comments, some 
directed at defense counsel, which were deemed to be inappropriate 
statements of personal belief.219 
In United States v. Rosa, the defense attorney began closing argument 
with vitriolic, if arguably permissible, attacks on the credibility of the 
government’s witnesses, but the attorney then went further and 
complained about “the United States Government spending your money 
and mine trying to get some little fish . . . .  Does it not gripe you that the 
people who do the dastardly deeds are the ones who get the breaks?  The 
ones who escape punishment?”220  The propriety and the various reasons 
for the government deciding to engage in an investigation and prosecution 
are not relevant to the elements of the alleged offenses and therefore were 
not before the jury.  While “breaks” given to cooperating witnesses are 
pertinent to assessing credibility of those witnesses, the defense attorney 
 
215. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). 
216. See id. at 8–11. 
217. Id. at 11. 
218. See, e.g., D. Mass. R. 116.1-116.10 (2018) (setting out specific procedures for the 
exchange of discovery overseen by magistrate judge). 
219. Young, 470 U.S. at 8–9. 
220. United States v. Rosa, 705 F.2d 1375, 1379 (1st Cir. 1983). 
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suggested that the jury’s “gripe” about prosecutorial decisions be a reason 
to acquit.221  The defense attorney also accused the government of “using 
a whale to catch a minnow” and “cho[osing] to exercise all of its resources 
and come down on the head of a lowly police officer simply because he is 
a police officer.”222  These were more reasons to decide the case outside 
the evidence. 
Government counsel responded with a brief statement that the 
government stood by its case and that “I, personally, make no excuses for 
this case.”223  The Rosa court, without explicitly deciding whether the 
remarks were improper personal opinions, held that there was no prejudice 
in light of the prior attack by the defense and declined to reverse the 
conviction.224  It is worth considering how, in those circumstances, a 
prosecutor was hamstrung to respond.  The rationale, the internal 
deliberations on what charges to bring, and whether to enter into a plea 
agreement and on what terms, would not have been part of the evidence.  
There may be persuasive reasons, on a moral level, for these prosecutorial 
or investigative decisions, but they cannot be shared with the jury.  
Likewise, the portrayal of the defendant as a sympathetic character (i.e., a 
“lowly police officer” being “crucif[ied]”225) might, depending on the 
case, lose some of its luster if the entirety of the defendant’s background, 
including inadmissible bad acts, were given to the jury.  Jury nullification 
efforts like the ones employed in Rosa are one-sided arguments. 
Other cases illustrate the conundrum of responding to jury 
nullification arguments during the government’s summation.  In United 
States v. Machor, the defense claimed that the cooperating witness, the 
law enforcement agent, and the prosecutor in the courtroom were trying 
to frame him for a crime he did not commit.226  How could the prosecutor 
respond to a claim that he himself was trying to fabricate a case against 
the defendant unless evidence about the workings of the prosecution team 
had been introduced at trial?  In United States v. Adams, the defendant’s 
attorney argued that the government ignored other suspects, but decisions 
about arresting and prosecuting people other than the defendant are not 
relevant to whether the defendant committed the alleged offenses, so those 
 
221. Id. at 1379. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 1379–80. 
224. See id. at 1380. 
225. Id. at 1379. 
226. United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945, 956 (1st Cir. 1989). 
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decisions and the reasons for them were not before the jury.227  In United 
States v. Trujillo, the defense attacked the indictment in closing argument, 
suggesting nefarious reasons for why certain co-conspirators had not been 
named in the charging document, which alleged a drug conspiracy.228  A 
prosecutor had drafted the indictment, but that drafting process was surely 
not part of the trial. 
In each of these cases, the prosecutor responded to the defense 
arguments with remarks later challenged on appeal.  In Machor, the 
prosecutor stated: “‘[I]n order to present this case, do you really think we 
have to fabricate it[?]  As [the defendant] told you, that even the 
prosecutor was here fabricating a case.  That’s me.’”229  This was deemed 
error, but not reversible error.230  This statement sounded like vouching, 
but there was no means to rebut the outside-the-record attack on the 
prosecutor.  In Adams, the prosecutor responded by saying that the federal 
agents could have arrested other people but “‘[t]hey’re not here looking 
for numbers.’”231  On appeal, the First Circuit said this “could be viewed 
as a form of vouching for the competence and integrity of the police and 
probably should not have been said,” but it found that the statement was 
not prejudicial.232  In Trujillo, the prosecutor responded by stating that the 
judge was responsible for the legal sufficiency of the indictment and that 
if the judge thought the indictment was not proper, the jury would not have 
been asked to decide the case.233  This rejoinder, an accurate statement 
about the roles of the judge and jury, was deemed not to be error,234 but as 
a matter of advocacy, it probably failed to thwart the real thrust of the 
defendant’s attack.  Questioning who was named in the indictment was 
probably designed to emphasize the unfairness of charging one defendant 
when others were not charged.  Addressing that would have required 
argument outside the evidence. 
“In our tradition, defense counsel are allowed a good measure of 
latitude in summing up to the jury . . . .”235  While courts have 
acknowledged the thrust and parry nature of improper closing arguments 
by defense counsel and prosecutors, there has been little recognition of the 
 
227. United States v. Adams, 305 F.3d 30, 37–38 (1st Cir. 2002). 
228. United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 104 (11th Cir. 1983). 
229. Machor, 879 F.2d at 955 (first alteration in original). 
230. Id. at 955–56. 
231. Adams, 305 F.3d at 37. 
232. Id. 
233. Trujillo, 714 F.2d at 104. 
234. Id. at 104–05. 
235. Adams, 305 F.3d at 38. 
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conundrum that jury nullification arguments create for prosecutors.  It is 
not just a matter of “fighting fire with fire,”236 as if counsel are simply 
trading heated personal insults.  Rather, there is often, as these examples 
demonstrate, a deeper purpose behind improper defense argument.  It is 
not just a matter of turning up the heat in the courtroom, but rather an 
attempt to take the jury outside the facts and the law, and to decide the 
case based on sympathy for the defendant or disgust for the government.  
Once the debate ventures outside the evidence introduced during the trial, 
the ethical prosecutor has few tools in her forensic toolkit. 
III. CLOSING ARGUMENT SHOULD MIRROR THE TRIAL 
A. Toward a Better Rule on Vouching and Personal Opinion 
As one scholar has said about the law of closing argument in North 
Dakota, the cases “do not provide easy reading.”237  Another commentator 
has said that “the state and federal courts are perpetually divided as to 
what constitutes proper closing argument, which is at best ‘wrought with 
uncertainty.’”238  The most recent treatment of the subject from the United 
States Supreme Court, United States v. Young, acknowledged the 
difficulty in drawing a line between acceptable and unacceptable 
statements, noting “there is often a gray zone.”239  The discussion of 
federal cases in Part I of this Article, as well as decisions from Maine and 
Kansas, illustrate the ongoing difficulty courts and practitioners have had 
in applying the rule against vouching and personal opinion in closing 
arguments. 
This Article has attempted to explain why this area of the law has 
been so difficult for courts to articulate.  Put simply, the effort in federal 
courts to allow arguments on key issues, including witness credibility, 
while separating out statements of personal opinion, has run aground 
because repeated attempts to identify forbidden words and phrases has 
rendered a body of case law that is contradictory and elevates form over 
substance.  The experiences of Maine and Kansas, jurisdictions which 
have tried to set stricter standards by disallowing argument on witness 
credibility altogether, are not more encouraging.240  If taken seriously, 
 
236. Id. at 37. 
237. Ahlen, supra note 15, at 102. 
238. Craig Lee Montz, Why Lawyers Continue to Cross the Line in Closing Argument: An 
Examination of Federal and State Cases, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 67, 69 (2001) (quoting Gary D. 
Fox, Objectionable Closing Argument: Causes and Solutions, 70 FLA. B.J. 43, 47 (1996)). 
239. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). 
240. See supra Sections I.C.5.a–b. 
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these standards eliminate meaningful argument on the key issues in the 
trial.  If honored in the breach, the strict standards sow more confusion 
than ever. 
The fundamental issue is that courts have failed to give independent 
meaning to the rule against statements of personal belief.  If, for example, 
a prosecutor’s first-person statement refers to matters that were not subject 
to proof during the trial, it is covered by the rule against arguing outside 
the evidence, which I have called the prime directive.241  If the prosecutor 
seeks to assure the jury about the credibility of the police witnesses 
because she knows them well from working with them in many cases, that 
is impermissible vouching and violative of the prime directive as well.  
The rule against personal opinions, if it means anything, must apply where 
those two concerns are not present.  Where courts have explained the rule 
against personal opinions in terms of arguing outside the evidence or 
vouching, they have left pregnant the question of what the rule against 
personal opinions means. 
Literally speaking, almost everything a prosecutor says during 
closing argument is a statement of personal belief.  Unless a statement of 
the prosecutor is a statement of fact, it is a statement of opinion, in that it 
draws an inference or a conclusion.  Advocacy is the expression of 
opinions.  Effective advocacy is the expression of opinions, well-
supported by facts and logic.  All those opinions, for the prosecutor, are 
personal.  The prosecutor has decided to pursue the case, and he must, 
under attorneys’ ethics rules, honestly and subjectively believe that the 
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  By contrast, the defense 
attorney may subjectively believe his client is, without a doubt, guilty, but 
he honors his profession by zealously arguing for acquittal based on the 
evidence at trial.  It is glaringly obvious to any juror that the prosecutor 
subjectively believes in what he is arguing.  It insults the intelligence of 
jurors to think that they would perceive an “it is submitted” statement to 
be any less of a personal belief than an “I submit” statement.  In either 
case, the government lawyer is doing the submitting, and even converting 
a statement to the passive voice still leaves the prosecutor in the courtroom 
as the speaker. 
For these reasons, courts are able, with some reason, to identify 
almost any portion of disputed closing argument by the prosecutor and say 
it violated the rule against personal opinions.  After all, it is hard to say 
that suggesting that a witness was not telling the truth, or that a defendant 
committed fraud is not an opinion, inference, or conclusion.  And since 
 
241. See supra Section I.B. 
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the prosecutor is the person making the statement, it is personal.  Then 
again, arguing that a drug defendant intended to distribute two kilograms 
of cocaine found in his car because he had just texted his customer the 
price for the drugs and had arranged a time to meet the person is also an 
inference or conclusion, and it is equally personal.  But a classic argument 
like that is never thought to fall within the rule against personal opinions. 
So, what is the difference between acceptable and unacceptable 
personal opinions?  If the only difference is that one argument is supported 
by the evidence (like the example about the cocaine found in the car) and 
another argument is not, then the prosecutorial sin is violating the prime 
directive, and the rule against personal opinions has no independent 
meaning. 
Experience has shown that the rule against personal opinion—when 
it does have independent meaning—functions as a civility code enforced 
by appellate judges after the fact.242  Because the literal scope of the rule 
is so vast, it is a convenient mechanism for picking out statements or 
words that judges would prefer not to hear and calling them out as 
violating the rule against personal opinion.  The countless decisions 
condemning the words “lie,” “lying,” or “liar” can best be understood as 
simply a feeling that it is impolite to directly accuse—in person, no less—
somebody of lying.  These decisions make little or no distinction, as they 
ought to, between accusing the defendant of “lying” in his courtroom 
testimony and being a “liar.”  The latter characterization could, depending 
on the context in which the word is used, suggest the defendant has a track 
record of lying that has not been shared with the jury.  The distinctions in 
phraseology that many courts have found so important, where they 
acknowledge that the jury could properly receive the same substantive 
argument from the prosecutor, is simply a preference for a more genteel 
or more elevated delivery.  Substituting “I am telling you that” with “the 
government submits that” takes the edge off the words that follow.  Such 
substitutions reflect a preference for a formal way of talking over plain 
speaking.  After all, who, in ordinary conversation, would say in reference 
to an important matter “a conclusion on your part may be drawn,” rather 
than “I think”? 
Of course, some courts permit more plain speaking than others.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had held that a 
prosecutor’s use of “colorful pejoratives” like “fraudster” and “Jason 
Branch is a fraud” was not improper where “the closing was limited to 
 
242. See supra Section I.C. 
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what the government (and ultimately the jury) believed the evidence had 
proved.”243  Some federal and state courts have found that the use of the 
word “lie” is acceptable as a means of arguing the evidence, whereas as 
others find it to be beyond the pale (i.e., per se misconduct).244  In Maine, 
it was deemed acceptable to say that the defendant was an admitted liar, 
where he admitted to lying on the stand, but it was improper to say, based 
on the evidence, that a defendant charged with lying had lied since the 
defendant himself did not admit that he had lied.245  In that situation, the 
prosecutor must take care not to contradict the defendant in an adversarial 
proceeding.  In sketching out the rule against personal opinion, the rules 
seem to be a matter of taste. 
It is worth remembering that violations of the rule against personal 
opinions are analyzed in federal court under the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution.246  Thus, where prosecutorial statements are 
found to be improper, it is a Constitutional violation.  Where the error 
results in overturning a conviction, the remark must have “so infected the 
trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process.”247  Where closing argument error is found due to characteristics 
of phrasing; where general, concluding remarks about the defendant’s 
guilt are error; where error is found when the prosecutor argues that the 
defendant lied when the evidence supports that inference;248 it is difficult 
to believe that these kinds of error are of a fundamental, constitutional 
magnitude.  The lack of harm, if any, from many of the statements that 
have been found to violate the rule against personal opinions is readily 
apparent to any reader.  A finishing sentence like, “I think when you look 
at the evidence in this case and use your common sense, there’s only one 
conclusion you can reach and that is that this defendant Joseph Smith has 
 
243. United States v. Branch, 591 F.3d 602, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2009). 
244. See Claire Gagnon, Note, A Liar by Any Other Name? Iowa’s Closing Argument 
Conundrum, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 471, 490 (2007) (explaining that although Iowa does not allow 
the prosecutor to argue that the defendant lied, most jurisdictions do); Craig Lee Montz, Calling 
the Witness a Liar During Closing Argument: The Florida Supreme Court’s Final Approval, 75 
FLA. B.J. 49, 50 (2001) (explaining that it is permissible in Florida to call a witness a liar if the 
evidence supports the conclusion); see also supra Sections I.C.4–5. 
245. See State v. Casella, 632 A.2d 121, 123 (Me. 1993). 
246. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642–43 (1974). 
247. See id.; see also Branch, 591 F.3d at 609 (“[W]hen a prosecutor’s remarks are 
arguably improper, the defendant must still prove that these remarks made the entire trial 
fundamentally unfair and the verdict would have changed absent these comments.” (citing 
Kellogg v. Skon, 176 F.3d 447 (8th Cir.1999))); United States v. Coriaty, 300 F.3d 244, 255 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (same). 
248. See supra Sections I.C.3–5. 
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been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,”249 does not scream out 
that the fairness of the trial has, in one blow, been undermined.  Rather, it 
is the prosecutor asking the jury to find the defendant guilty, something 
that everyone in the courtroom would expect a prosecutor to do.  When a 
court then says that the prosecutorial sin can be expiated by changing “I 
think” to “the government submits,” the legal analysis has left the 
constitutional realm. 
While some courts have frequently found prosecutorial misconduct 
in closing argument, it is far less likely for courts to find that the error was 
so prejudicial that overturning the conviction is necessary.250  Only when 
the errant remark has “‘so poisoned the well’ that it is likely that the 
verdict was affected,” will a conviction be vacated.251  The touchstones 
for prejudice from statements of personal opinion are references to matters 
outside the evidence and vouching.252  This shows that the harm from 
these kinds of statements stems not from their “personal” nature, but from 
lack of adherence to the prime directive.  If the prosecutor is arguing 
within the evidence, most courts will find that straying into forbidden 
formulations does not impact the trial.253  It is worth asking, then, whether 
many of these violations ought to be considered constitutional error at all 
if there is no discernible harmful impact on the trial.254 
The legal system would be better off if the current rule against 
personal opinions were simply abolished.  The foregoing analysis has 
shown that the search to find independent meaning in this rule has been 
fruitless.255  It functions as a convenient mechanism to enforce the varying 
norms of decorum which exist around the country, with the range of 
 
249. United States v. Smith, 982 F.2d 681, 684 n.2 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis omitted). 
250. Cicchini, supra note 61, at 893–95 (noting with frustration how infrequently closing 
argument errors lead to reversal). 
251. Smith, 982 F.2d at 682 (quoting United States v. Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 274 
(1st Cir. 1987)). 
252. See United States v. Wihbey, 75 F.3d 761, 771–72 (1st Cir. 1996). 
253. See supra Section I.C.3 (discussing various First Circuit cases in which error was 
found for expression of personal opinion but no reversible error was found). 
254. United States v. Stover, 474 F.3d 904, 916 (6th Cir. 2007).  One case from the Sixth 
Circuit drew perhaps the finest of distinctions to find a statement improper, but not prejudicial 
error: “The difference between what the prosecutor actually said—‘he is a liar’—and what the 
prosecutor could have permissibly said, that the evidence suggested that Defendant Hinton’s 
testimony is not credible, is minimal.  This statement does not require reversal . . . .”  Id.  This 
phenomenon of finding error where there is no substantive difference between an acceptable 
and unacceptable statement, but then finding no prejudice, degrades the idea of a violation of 
constitutional rights. 
255. See supra Section I.C. 
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acceptable commentary established by the eye of the beholder.256  Courts 
and practitioners could stop puzzling over whether remarks are “personal” 
or not and focus on the true harm that can come from improper 
summations.  The constitutional analysis should concentrate on whether 
the prosecutor has tried to use facts outside the record to secure a 
conviction or has attempted to lend the prestige of his office or the office 
of the police department to the weight of her case.  This is the true concern 
of the rule against personal opinions. 
This proposal would place this area of the law on closing arguments 
on a stronger analytical foundation.  With the prime directive at the center 
of the inquiry, courts and practitioners could analyze whether the 
prosecutor’s closing has stayed within the bounds of the trial.  “In arguing 
the law to the jury, counsel is confined to principles that will later be 
incorporated and charged to the jury.”257  Likewise with the facts, 
attorneys should be confined to the evidence introduced by the parties and 
deemed admissible during the course of the trial by the trial judge.  
Closing arguments should mirror the trial. 
A practitioner deciding ex ante whether to make a particular argument 
should simply ask whether the matter was part of the trial.  If, for example, 
certain bad acts of the defendant were known to the prosecutor but were 
excluded by the trial judge as unfairly prejudicial, then those bad acts 
should not be part of closing argument, even if responsive to the defense 
attorney’s arguments.  Closing argument is not the time to bring in new 
facts or new theories.  Improper vouching can be discerned by this 
mirroring principle.  If the police officer has been allowed to testify about 
the number of years of his experience, then that may be part of the 
argument.  If the police officer has not testified about the collateral 
consequences to his career if he lies on the stand, as he probably would 
not be allowed to do, then that point is out of bounds and cannot be used 
to bolster the credibility of the police witness.258 
At the same time, arguments that comply with this mirroring principle 
should be permitted.  Thus, when a defendant has testified and has offered 
an implausible, inconsistent, self-serving version of events, it is fair to 
 
256. Because these norms are established through appellate review, often due to alleged 
errors neither objected to, nor censured by the trial judge, closing arguments are judged by how 
the words appear on paper.  See supra Sections I.C.5.a–b (showing the unworkability of strict 
rules against personal opinion in Maine and Kansas). 
257. United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 106 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. 
Sawyer, 443 F.2d 712, 714 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). 
258. See Pettys, supra note 190, at 517 (explaining that under traditional rules of evidence 
and procedure “a plain symmetry exists between evidentiary relevance, on the one hand, and 
jury instructions and closing arguments, on the other”). 
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argue that the defendant lied, fabricated, or told a tall tale, where that 
conclusion is supported by references to the evidence.  Similarly, arguing 
that other witnesses have told the truth should be allowed as long as it is 
in the context of arguing the evidence in the case.  A general concluding 
or introductory statement, such as the “defendant lied to his customers and 
committed fraud,” should be acceptable where it is a way to headline a 
discussion about the evidence supporting a defendant’s guilt on fraud 
charges. 
Focusing counsel’s attention on the basic principle of confining 
oneself to the evidence and the law introduced during the trial is a sounder 
approach than a list of “guidelines,” which some well-meaning 
commentators have suggested.259  These varying guidelines tend to be 
nearly as general and as indeterminate as the maxim of prohibiting 
statements of personal opinion.  Telling an attorney that she may “[u]rge 
the jury to draw reasonable inferences and conclusions from the evidence” 
while also repeating the admonition to steer clear of statements of personal 
belief260 returns the attorney to the same contradictions and 
inconsistencies which have made the case law not “easy reading.”261 
The mirroring concept, which is simply a corollary to the prime 
directive, would be used to police constitutional violations stemming from 
improper prosecutorial comments during closing argument.  That is not to 
say that courts would be compelled to accept any standard of behavior, so 
long as the lawyer confined himself to arguing the evidence and stayed 
within the law articulated by the trial judge.  Trial judges have broad 
discretion in the conduct of trials.262  There are remarks, as one 
experienced Massachusetts trial judge has written, that fall within the 
category of “better left unsaid”263: 
Juries are entitled to better than “don’t let the smoke fool you,” “throw 
the defendant’s testimony out the window, because it’s all baloney;” 
“this case is about a desperate man, a predator getting his prey into 
that motel room and leaving her there for dead;” and “take everything 
the defendant said and throw it in the garbage can.”264 
 
259. See Ahlen, supra note 15, at 105–07; Nidiry, supra note 6, at 1327–34. 
260. Ahlen, supra note 15, at 106–07. 
261. See id. at 102. 
262. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 10 (1985). 
263. Agnes, supra note 25, at 35. 
264. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Ormonde, 770 N.E.2d 36, 39–40 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2002)). 
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Language like that could well be called “crude,” “bombastic,” or 
“sarcastic,”265 and subject to censure, or the language could be deemed, in 
the taste of the presiding trial judge, and in the context of a particular trial, 
acceptable plain speaking.  In either event, this mode of expression is not 
the stuff of a violation of fundamental constitutional rights.266 
It should be possible to regulate attorney behavior during closing 
argument, and even to impose varying, particular, modes of decorum, 
without making it a matter of constitutional import.  This is a proposal, in 
other words, to delegate the policing of language and tone during closing 
arguments to the trial court level, and to leave it there.  Appellate courts 
analyzing whether due process has in fact been denied should be looking 
to the mirroring principle and to violations of the prime directive to decide 
whether the prosecutor has played by the rules of the trial or has done real 
harm by violating them.  Thus, the system could address the legitimate 
concern articulated by Justice Burger in Young, where he observed that 
the unseemly back-and-forth between defense counsel and the prosecutor 
“has no place in the administration of justice.”267  The better remedy to 
this breakdown in professionalism “would have been for the District Judge 
to deal with the improper argument of the defense counsel promptly and 
thus blunt the need for the prosecutor to respond.”268  The real issue in 
Young was not that a fundamentally fair trial was in jeopardy because the 
prosecutor couched his remarks as “personal impressions” when invited 
to do so by defense counsel, but that counsel’s verbal jousting gave the 
trial an unbecoming look.269  This is the sort of sub-constitutional concern 
that trial judges are well-equipped to deal with in the moment. 
Finally, it is important to distinguish between oral advocacy that is 
sub-optimal, or not effective, and closing arguments that create legal error.  
As a prosecutor who tries cases, I find many of the challenged closing 
arguments found in the case reporters cringe-worthy, at least on the cold 
paper.  Repeatedly calling the defendant a liar is not my style and I would 
not do it even if it were permitted.  It just does not seem effective, whereas 
maintaining one’s dignity and being precise and logical with the facts and 
the law tends to imbue the prosecutor in the courtroom with more 
credibility.  On the other hand, not all lawyers operate at the same level of 
 
265. Id. 
266. Ormonde, 770 N.E.2d at 39–40 (finding no error in closing argument that was on the 
“crude side”). 
267. Young, 470 U.S. at 9. 
268. Id. at 13. 
269. Id. at 10 (emphasizing the trial judge’s responsibility to maintain proper decorum in 
the courtroom). 
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competence, or at least with the same style.  As long as trials continue to 
have closing arguments,270 the zone of acceptable advocacy must be fairly 
wide.  Lawyers have different vocabularies, different ways of expressing 
themselves, and different capacities to modulate between ordinary, plain 
speaking, and more lawyerly speech.  Moreover, a closing argument is not 
a written or memorized speech.  At their best, closing arguments are a mix 
of careful preparation and extemporaneous speaking.271  As such, 
forbidding common verbal formulations, like all first-person statements, 
is a trap that will be sprung with regularity because even the most cautious 
advocate can, in a split second, preface a comment on the evidence with 
“I think” because it is so natural to do so.  Refocusing the prosecutor’s 
charge on staying within the evidence introduced at trial is a way to avoid 
these needless traps and stumbles. 
B.  Policing Jury Nullification Efforts More Effectively 
The mirroring principle proposed in this Article is an effective means 
to understand and implement the rules relating to arguing within the 
evidence, vouching, and personal opinions.  It is also a useful concept in 
understanding and policing appeals to jury nullification during closing 
arguments.  As discussed in Part II of this Article, jury nullification 
occupies an ambiguous place in criminal trials, and this ambiguity 
presents a conundrum for the prosecutor when faced with an argument 
based in whole or in part on jury nullification. 
While appellate courts have generally adopted a hostile attitude to 
jury nullification in our legal system, they have not required that a trial 
judge give an instruction that the jury must convict if it finds the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, much as the jury is told that it must 
acquit if it finds that the government had not met its burden of proof.272  It 
is not clear what the case is for making this a matter of the trial judge’s 
discretion, for example, allowing the trial judge to simply say that the jury 
“should” convict if it finds the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
 
270. Cf. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858 (1975) (“There can be no doubt that 
closing argument for the defense is a basic element of the adversary factfinding process in a 
criminal trial.”). 
271. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646–47 (1974) (“[C]losing arguments 
of counsel, are seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation frequently 
results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than crystal clear.”) (emphasis omitted). 
272. See, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1189–90 (1st Cir. 1993); 
PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT § 3.02 
(U.S. DIST. COURT ME. 2018), https://www.med.uscourts.gov/pdf/crpjilinks.pdf (providing that 
the jury must acquit if the evidence is insufficient; the jury should convict if the government has 
met its burden). 
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doubt.  This, as the First Circuit has recognized, subtly suggests the 
possibility of jury nullification,273 even though juries (except in a handful 
of states) are not to be instructed explicitly on jury nullification.274  While 
there are many matters that are necessarily left to the trial judge’s 
discretion, there is no good reason to encourage a non-uniform response 
to jury nullification, unless, of course, one seeks to promote jury 
nullification, which some scholars, practitioners, and judges have done.275  
Allowing or not allowing jury nullification is a basic proposition that 
requires a single, unequivocal answer.  Appellate courts should require 
that trial judges give a “must/must” instruction.  That is, the jury must 
acquit if there is reasonable doubt, and it must convict if the government 
has met its burden of proof.  Failing that, they should do a better job of 
explaining why perpetuating the ambiguity of jury nullification serves a 
laudable purpose.  For the same reasons, appellate courts should require, 
rather than simply permit, trial judges to block efforts by defense counsel 
from raising jury nullification arguments. 
So long as trial judges retain the discretion to give a “must/must” 
instruction, they should do so.  Similarly, the trial judge should prevent 
defense counsel from making jury nullification arguments either before or 
during closing argument.  With both of these steps, the trial judge can 
prevent a mismatch between the scope of the trial and the scope of closing 
argument.  Evidence would be admitted according to lawful notions of 
relevance, and the prosecutor and defense attorney would argue within the 
facts introduced at trial.  The prosecutor would not be tempted to respond 
to outside-the-record arguments by defense counsel by going outside the 
record herself.  To those who believe in a criminal justice system without 
jury nullification—apart from the jury’s naked power to engage in it—
having both sides arguing within the evidence is the best-case scenario. 
The mirroring principle provides an effective response to those who 
would prefer to open the door a crack to jury nullification (i.e., with a 
“must/should” instruction and the trial judge taking no steps to block jury 
nullification arguments) or to those who want to open the door entirely to 
jury nullification.  The mirroring principle says that permitting jury 
nullification arguments means that the scope of evidence admitted at trial 
 
273. See Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1189–90. 
274. See Korroch & Davidson, supra note 186, at 133 (“[T]he prevailing judicial opinion 
steadfastly has been opposed to permitting the jury to know that it has the power to acquit ‘in 
the teeth of both the law and facts.’”). 
275. See Bressler, supra note 201, at 1140–41; Del Frate, supra note 194, at 180–88; 
Korroch & Davidson, supra note 186, at 138. 
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should be revisited.276  If, for example, defense counsel seeks an acquittal 
based on an appeal to sympathy for the defendant, and the trial judge will 
allow that argument to be made, then the prosecution should be permitted 
to present information about some of the defendant’s unsympathetic 
characteristics.  If the defense is to be allowed to argue that the 
government’s charging decisions unfairly targeted a “little fish,” then the 
government should be permitted to put on evidence and explain why it 
made the charging decisions it did.  This would include showing the 
societal benefit in deterring such “little fish” from engaging in criminal 
behavior, or showing that the defendant is not such a “little fish,” based 
on, for example, his criminal record.  If the defense wishes to argue that a 
mandatory minimum sentence would be unjust and that a jury should 
consider the potential punishment before deciding whether to convict, 
then the government should be allowed to present the sort of information 
that a judge considers at a sentencing hearing, such as, again, the 
defendant’s criminal history. 
If these scenarios seem unpalatable for proponents of jury 
nullification, it is only because litigating the righteousness of the 
government’s cause is apt to be a fraught endeavor for the defendant when 
the jury hears both sides.277  Ordinarily, efforts at jury nullification take 
place where the defense can create a mismatch between the scope of the 
trial and the scope of closing argument.  It is in this space that the defense 
attorney advances a jury nullification argument, and the prosecutor has 
nothing in the record to rebut the argument with.  In that case, the 
government’s choices are to leave, for example, a charge that the 
prosecutor in the courtroom is trying to fabricate a case against the 
defendant,278 unaddressed, which could be taken by the jury as a tacit 
admission, or the government could respond in kind by going outside the 
record, which would be error.  This latter scenario would seem to be the 
worst-case scenario, with the jury hearing argument from both sides 
unconnected to the evidence they heard during the trial.  How is a jury to 
evaluate an argument when it has not heard the evidence establishing the 
 
276. See Pettys, supra note 190, at 517 (explaining that symmetry must exist between 
evidence and closing arguments under traditional rules of evidence). 
277. See id. at 518–22 (noting the substantial implications that allowing moral appeals 
from both sides would have on closing arguments); Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 987–99 
(permitting jury nullification and defense counsel to argue for it would “radically alter the scope 
of the modern criminal trial,” including substantial changes to the rules of evidence). 
278. See United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945, 956 (1st Cir. 1989). 
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facts underlying that argument?  As the Young court said, “two improper 
arguments—two apparent wrongs—do not make for a right result.”279 
Applying the mirroring principle to a bid for jury nullification is a 
mental exercise that should discourage courts from allowing jury 
nullification arguments to enter the trial at all and should encourage courts 
to take active steps to prevent it.  When Judge Weinstein suggested that a 
jury ought to be informed of the mandatory minimum sentence in a child 
pornography case,280 did he envision putting before the jury all of the 
matters a judge would consider at sentencing, such as victim impact 
statements from the children whose pictures were in the defendant’s 
collection, the defendant’s prior criminal record, the defendant’s 
upbringing and home life, and his drug history?  If not, the jury would be 
invited to consider punishment in the context of the government’s 
evidence being confined to the narrow question of whether the defendant 
committed the alleged child pornography crimes, leaving a very 
incomplete picture of the matters relevant to punishment.281  If evidence 
would be taken on all of these issues relating to punishment, the trial 
would grow to enormous proportions—it would be a tale of the 
defendant’s whole life, plus a whole host of other matters.  There would 
be rival versions of the defendant’s childhood, and no doubt, of the 
circumstances of his prior criminal cases.  The trial would be 
unmanageable, with the questions of morality and sympathy for the 
defendant overshadowing the question of whether sufficient proof exists 
for the alleged offense or offenses.  It would be the very picture of 
lawlessness. 
Addressing the ambiguous place of jury nullification in closing 
arguments requires the attention of the trial judge to this issue during the 
entirety of the trial, and it requires the prosecutor to object when he or she 
sees it.  More importantly, it requires the judiciary as a whole to decide 
 
279. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). 
280. See United States v. Polouizzi, 687 F. Supp. 2d 133, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated 
on other grounds, 393 Fed. Appx. 784 (2d Cir. 2010). 
281. See id. at 199 for the district judge’s reference to the “jury’s historic Sixth 
Amendment mercy-dispensing powers.”  The judge thought said powers could be unleashed in 
view of “the special circumstances [of] the mandatory minimum sentence unknown to the jury, 
the need for psychiatric help in view of sexual childhood abuse, the locked door behind which 
viewing took place, and other factors.”  Id. at 204.  The district judge paints a sympathetic 
picture of the defendant’s upbringing in Italy and other personal history, matters which are not 
susceptible of easy proof unless a fact-finder is inclined to simply take the defendant at his word 
on these historical facts.  See id. at 138–41.  His view of matters outside the normal bounds of 
relevance is rather myopic, as if the only thing a jury seeking to weigh the moral righteousness 
of the case, beyond the evidence of the crime alleged, is the defendant’s background.  It is as if 
the children in the thousands of child pornography images, whom the district judge refers to 
simply as “young girls,” are not in the equation.  See id. at 138. 
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the basic proposition of whether it is for or against jury nullification.  So 
long as that question remains unanswered, defendants will be tempted to 
make arguments outside the evidence and the law, and prosecutors will 
struggle to respond. 
CONCLUSION 
There is crying need for the parts of the law of closing argument 
discussed in this Article to be re-interpreted and simplified.  The law 
should be grounded in functional concerns rather than particular modes of 
expression.  The closing arguments at the end of trials should reflect or 
mirror the evidence admitted during the trial.  Reviewing alleged 
prosecutorial summation errors by that simple principle would parse out 
proper and improper argument.  Hewing to this mirroring principle would 
also help stamp out jury nullification from our criminal trials, which 
would advance the interests of the rule of law. 
